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ABSTRACT 
I argue against the commonly held intuition that robots and virtual agents will never have 
emotions by contending robots can have emotions in a sense that is functionally similar to hu-
mans, even if the robots' emotions are not exactly equivalent to those of humans. To establish a 
foundation for assessing the robots' emotional capacities, I first define what emotions are by 
characterizing the components of emotion consistent across emotion theories. Second, I dissect 
the affective-cognitive architecture of MIT's Kismet and Leonardo, two robots explicitly de-
signed to express emotions and to interact with humans, in order to explore whether they have 
emotions.  I argue that, although Kismet and Leonardo lack the subjective feelings component of 
emotion, they are capable of having emotions.  
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1     INTRODUCTION  
Whether machines could ever have emotions has been a perennial question explored both 
in the field of artificial intelligence and throughout the history of science fiction.  Many re-
searchers seem to have the intuition robots and virtual agents will never have emotions, claiming 
emotions emerge from the unique make-up of humans and therefore cannot be replicated in an 
artificial being.  I argue against this intuition by contending robots can have emotions in a sense 
that is functionally similar to humans, even if the robots' emotions are not exactly equivalent to 
those of humans. To establish a foundation for assessing the robots' emotional capacities, I first 
define what emotions are by characterizing the components of emotion consistent across emotion 
theories. Second, I dissect the affective-cognitive architecture of MIT's Kismet and Leonardo, 
two robots explicitly designed to express emotions and to interact with humans, in order to ex-
plore whether they have emotions.  I argue that, although Kismet and Leonardo lack the subjec-
tive feelings component of emotion, they are capable of having emotions  
The motivation for this project is two-fold: first, to derive a working model of emotions 
useful for artificial intelligence research, and second, to determine if this model could be realized 
within an embodied artificially intelligent agent. The first motivation stems from the concern that 
scientists, philosophers, and laypersons alike disagree about what emotions are and often provide 
conflicting theories to explain them.  For instance, a common intuition is that emotions must in-
volve a phenomenal experience of "what it is like" to be in a particular emotional state (i.e. a 
feeling; see Adolphs, 2005; Arbib, 2005).  Others argue it is possible to undergo an emotional 
episode without feeling anything at all (Nussbaum, 2001; Roberts, 2003).  In addition, some the-
orists have argued emotions most closely resemble cognitive judgments involving propositional 
attitudes (Calhoun & Solomon, 1984; Solomon 2004), while critics have pointed out that it is 
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possible for certain emotions, such as fear, to become activated without awareness of the elicit-
ing stimulus (Scarantino, 2010). A further problem arises when trying to classify emotions: Do 
emotions occur within discrete categories (e.g. anger, sadness, joy, etc.), or are they instantiated 
within an affective space constituted by one's level of arousal (i.e. one's alertness) and valence 
(i.e. one's pleasure or displeasure)? As a purely experimental approach has not yet answered the-
se questions, some further methodological reflection appears needed to resolve the debate on the 
nature of emotions.  
I argue that computational modeling provides the appropriate platform for researchers to 
test theories of emotion by observing whether a theory's implementation reproduces emotional 
behavior.  For a theory of emotions to be useful, it should be capable of replicating the central 
function of emotion: using attributions of value to stimuli in the environment to motivate actions 
that further an agent's progress toward its goal(s) (Scherer, 2005).  This is to say an agent encap-
sulating a model of emotions should retreat from a threatening or noxious stimulus, approach and 
engage with a rewarding stimulus, etc.  Furthermore, the agent should be capable of recognizing 
the emotional expressions of others, and should display expressions recognizable as correspond-
ing with particular emotional states (see Ekman, 1992 and Freitas-Magalhães, 2012 for a discus-
sion of the universality of facial expressions of emotion). To be clear, I am not claiming that a 
working model must reproduce emotions in an identical fashion to the way humans do.  Rather, I 
am making the more modest assertion that such models can help researchers to establish plausi-
ble mechanisms through which emotions emerge, and to reject or modify those mechanisms that 
are incapable of appraising and responding to salient stimuli in the environment. Thus, my intent 
in evaluating computational models of emotions is to determine what theories of emotion can 
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successfully be implemented to reproduce emotional behavior, so as to reduce some of the uncer-
tainty about what emotions are.  
The second motivation for this project is to determine whether robots can have emotions. 
Skepticism about the possibility of emotional robots is largely drawn from the contention that 
computational agents cannot have intentionality; the capacity to understand or represent states of 
affairs (Searle, 1980).  The general line of reasoning is that even a computational agent that can 
carry on a natural language conversation, for example, does not actually have an understanding 
of what is being discussed, as the agent's behavior is mechanistically determined by the algo-
rithms that underlie its architecture. By extension, robots that possess a model of emotions do not 
have emotions any more than a model of a rainstorm could get someone wet (Searle, 2002, p. 
16).  For Searle and his supporters, a model is simply a model, and can never replicate the target 
phenomenon.  
I will argue against the assertion that computational agents cannot have intentionality be-
cause their behavior is determined mechanically. The behavior of individual neurons is also de-
termined mechanistically: if a neuron receives enough excitatory stimulation from other neurons 
to surpass its threshold potential, then the neuron will fire an action potential. Otherwise, the 
neuron remains at rest.  Thus, if we accept that computational agents cannot have intentionality 
because their behavior is mechanistic, we must also accept that biological life cannot have inten-
tionality, including humans.  Proponents of biological realism might reply by asserting that it is 
the specific machinery of the brain that allows humans to have emotions, or as Searle states, "ac-
tual human mental phenomena [are] dependent on actual physical–chemical properties of actual 
human brains" (1990, p. 29).  There is, however, no reason to think human brains are the only 
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control systems
1
 capable of instantiating emotions.  I contend that so long as the computational 
agent is able to attribute value to environmental stimuli, based off  their relation to the agent's 
needs and goals, in order to determine a course of action, the agent is emotional. This is to say 
that what is necessary for having emotions is not a human physiology , but rather that the agent 
is able to appraise events in the environment, which in turn predispose the agent towards particu-
lar action tendencies and expressions for the sake of maintaining a sense of well-being.  In what 
follows, I will demonstrate there are at least two robots that display these requisite components 
of emotion by evaluating the affective-cognitive architecture with which they interact with the 
environment. This evaluation will show that it is possible for robots to have emotions which al-
low them to autonomously act toward the completion of their goals, without a control system that 
explicitly resembles a human brain.   
The possibility of robots having emotions entails serious consequences for how robots are 
integrated in human society within the future. Breazeal and Brooks (2005, p. 277-279) see at 
least four relationships between humans and emotional robots that could emerge: robots as tools, 
as avatars (human surrogates), partners (as in a team), or as cyborg extensions (prostheses). In 
the first case, for instance, a search-and-rescue robot could benefit from having interest and fear 
mechanisms for the sake of balancing the robot's persistence in searching for a missing person 
with its own self-preservation. Emotional robots could also serve as partners in elderly patient 
care settings, as these robots could be attuned to the specific signs of distress and anxiety exhib-
ited by the patient, in addition to keeping their company.  For those who have no desire to carry 
on interactions with robots as social partners, emotional robots still hold the advantage over un-
emotional robots in that they are less frustrating to deal with (Picard, 2003). A robot that is able 
                                                 
1
 Control system refers to a system that manages the behavior of other systems.  The brain is a control system in the 
sense that it takes in information from the sensory systems , circulatory system, etc., in order to determine the proper 
output signal to send to the motor system.  
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to recognize that a human is becoming irritated by an interaction by monitoring the human's ex-
pressions, for instance, can then modify its own behavior to be more accommodating, such as by 
asking how it may be of greater service, or by leaving the room.  In sum, providing robots with 
the capacity for emotions may improve the autonomy with which they carry out tasks, as well as 
the quality and helpfulness of their interactions with humans. 
The present work is intended for a wide audience: first, philosophers interested in the 
metaphysics of mind and emotions may be interested in exploring the embodied computational 
perspective expressed here.  Likewise, artificial intelligence researchers and engineers may find 
this work useful as a loose guide to how autonomous social behavior and goal directedness may 
be enabled in artificial agents by including an emotional system within their design. Finally, 
skeptics of the possibility that robots could have emotions will find this work an appropriate plat-
form for constructing a counterargument against robotic emotions, while supporters of robotic 
emotions may develop further grounds for their position. 
In conclusion, it is entirely possible for robots to have emotions, assuming they are able 
to attribute value to objects and events within the environment so as to motivate the execution of 
particular actions and expressions in order to attain a set of goals/sense of well-being. Further-
more, these attributions of value should be comparable to the attributions humans make (i.e. they 
should include assessments of arousal and valence), if robotic emotions are to be comparable to 
human emotions. The expressions produced by robots should also be recognizable to humans as 
corresponding with particular emotional states (e.g. sadness, disgust, etc.), such that the robot is 
able to coordinate others' behavior in appropriate way (e.g. to elicit sympathy, to indicate the 
presence of a noxious stimulus, etc.).  Of course, robots may have emotions in a different sense 
than humans do, as human well-being and robot well-being are likely to be distinguished from 
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each other.  By accepting the possibility that robots can have emotions, efforts may be taken to 
construct robots that are tailored to improve the lives of humans and perhaps the lives of robots 
as well.  
 
2    WHAT ARE EMOTIONS? 
There is disagreement in the affective science community about how to define emotions.  
No consensus appears to have been reached in the emotion literature as emotion theorists remain 
divided on whether the theory of basic emotions, core affect theory, or some other theory best 
characterizes affective phenomena.  Despite the variance among emotion theories' accounts of 
what emotions are, there is some agreement about the components that constitute prototypical  
emotional episodes and what their functions are.  In what follows, I will describe these compo-
nents, while staying neutral for the time being on which combination is essential for an emotion 
to be instantiated.  I will then describe the contemporary theories of emotion, while highlighting 
how each theory privileges different components as being integral to an emotional episode.  This 
exposition will serve two functions: 1) to demonstrate that each theory remains subject to unan-
swered criticism, and 2) to pick out commonalities between theories such that an account of 
emotions based of prototypical components can be forwarded in Chapter 5.  
 
2.1 Components of Emotion 
 2.1. 1 Appraisal of Events 
 An evaluation of events in the environment which leads an agent to have a particular 
emotion is an emotional appraisal (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Some appraisal theories hold ap-
praisals are only performed consciously (Lazarus, 1991), while others posit a two-process ap-
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praisal process, where unconscious appraisals are performed initially, and are followed by con-
scious appraisals (Smith & Kirby, 2009; Scherer, 2001).  Despite the distinctions between these 
appraisal theories, several commonalities emerge which indicate a shared theoretical understand-
ing.   For one, most contemporary theorists view appraisals as processes that evaluate how the 
current state of the environment relates to the agent's well-being (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & 
Frijda, 2013).  The agent's well-being is in turn determined by whether the environment satisfies 
or prevents satisfaction of the agent's needs, values, goals and beliefs (Frijda, 1986, 2007; 
Lazaraus, 1991; Scherer, 2004).  Appraisals of the significance of environmental events to the 
agent's well-being then coordinate changes in action tendencies, neurophysiological responses, 
motor expressions and feelings so as to promote greater well-being through interacting with the 
environment (Clore & Ortony, 2000; Roseman & Smith, 2001; Reisenzein, 1994; Scherer, 2001).   
2.1.2. Neurophysiological Changes  
After an appraisal of the environment has been performed, a set of neurophysiological 
changes occur in order to prepare the agent for action (Scherer, 2005). The most apparent chang-
es resulting from emotions involve activation of the autonomic nervous system and include 
changes in heart rate, digestion, respiration, perspiration, and pupil dilation (Purves et al., 2001).  
Although research has continually shown there are no "emotional centers" in the brain (Fellous 
& LeDoux, 2005), a number of brain structures have been implicated in emotional processing, 
including the amygdala (LeDoux, 2002), thalamus (Sherman, 2006), hypothalamus (Cao et al., 
2012), and the hippocampus (Fischer et al, 2002), among others. At the neurochemical level, 
emotions are thought to be coordinated by neuromodulation involving dopamine, noradrenaline, 
serotonin, oxytocin, cortisol and GABA (Fellous, 2004; Panksepp, 1993). Some theorists have 
even proposed models for how levels of these neuromodulators correlate with specific emotions, 
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such as anger with low levels of serotonin, high dopamine and high noradrenaline (Lövheim, 
2011).  Thus, observing changes in activity at these various levels of neurophysiology may give 
some indication of the observed agent's emotional state.   
2.1.3.  Action Tendencies 
An individual's cognitive and physiological preparedness to act is defined  by states of 
action readiness that are motivated as responses to significant events (Frijda, 1986; 1987; 2004). 
For an event to qualify as significant, it must be concerning to the individual or relate to the indi-
vidual's goals.  A typical example of a significant event is when Person A says something slan-
derous about Person B or her kin (e.g. "Your mother is a whore!").  On Frijda's account, a signif-
icant event is appraised on what the event does to the individual as well as what the individual 
may do to the event.  In the case of slander, Person B's appraisal will likely acknowledge "a de-
meaning offense against me and mine" (Lazarus, 1991), as well the possibility of retaliating 
against Person A.  The appraisal then motivates a change in action readiness that has both a 
quantitative aspect (activation) and a qualitative aspect (action tendency).  Activation refers to 
the intensity of an individual's neurophysiological arousal; the mobilization of energy towards 
carrying out an action (Frijda, 1986, p. 90).  Actions motivated by emotion have control prece-
dence over other behaviors (Frijda & Scherer, 2009).  If Person B is in the midst of a conversa-
tion when they are insulted by Person A, for instance, Person B's activation towards retaliating 
will override any other behavior she had intended.  An action tendency is a readiness to execute a 
particular action or set of actions that have the same intent.  Action tendencies allow for behav-
ioral flexibility as a person with an action tendency for retaliation may attack, spit on, insult, 
walk away from, or return slander to the person that offended them (p. 71).  As Frijda asserts ac-
tion tendencies are equivalent to emotions, feelings refer to an individual's awareness of the for-
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mation of their action tendencies as well as their execution.  Thus, Frijda provides an account 
that sets motivation toward particular actions after a significant event as central to what consti-
tutes emotion. 
Deliberative action tendencies involve conscious reflection on the behavior to carry out 
(Frijda, 2010).  In contrast, the tendency to retreat when frightened exemplifies an impulsive ac-
tion tendency, as the scared person automatically withdraws from the feared object without con-
sidering alternative courses of action.  Frijda distinguishes impulsive actions from reflexes on the 
grounds that they are intentional; although the appraisals that cause them are formed without 
conscious deliberation, impulsive actions are directed towards specific objects (e.g. a threatening 
person or animal) and bear an intent (e.g. to avoid the potential for injury).  They are also differ-
entiated from habits and routines such as brushing one's teeth or driving home, as impulsive ac-
tion tendencies demand immediate attention.  Through the formation of action tendencies, both 
impulsive and deliberative, an agent is driven to modify the environment so as to maintain or fur-
ther her own well-being.  
2.1.4. Expressions 
Expressions prompted by an emotional process include facial displays (Keltner et al., 
2003; Ekman et al., 1992; Parkinson, 2013), vocal intonations (Russell et al., 2003; Scherer, 
2003), and body postures (Wallbott, 1998; Coulson, 2004).  As a full account of all forms of ex-
pression is beyond the scope of this thesis, I will focus specifically on facial displays, which ap-
pear most often in the emotion literature.  
Facial expressions appear to communicate social intentions, while also conveying infor-
mation about the emotion which motivated the display (Ekman, 1994; Fridlund; 1994).  For ex-
ample, bared teeth may reveal an intention for aggressive interaction and convey information 
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about an underlying state of anger.  While expressions are taken to be voluntary on Fridlund's 
(1994) view, there is reason to think facial displays can be involuntarily produced for the sake 
addressing a salient stimulus requiring immediate attention.  There also appear to be informal 
social norms within a given culture, known as display rules, which dictate when and where it is 
appropriate to express particular emotions (Siegler, 2006).  For example, displays of anger are 
less frequently displayed in collectivistic cultures such as Chinese culture, than individualistic 
cultures, such as the United States, as displays of angers are taken as threatening to group har-
mony (Miyake & Yamazaki, 1995). In sum, facial expressions serve to communicate an individ-
ual's social intentions, such that interactants may coordinate their actions to achieve mutual 
achievement of their goals.  
2.1.5.  Subjective Feelings 
Feelings are notoriously difficult phenomena to characterize, due to their subjective na-
ture.  Unlike facial expressions or physiological changes, feelings are primarily measured 
through self-reports.  This difficulty in measuring feelings thus leads to uncertainty in under-
standing what role they play in an emotional episode.  Nevertheless, feelings are suggested to 
serve as central representations of the patterns of change occurring for each component, such that 
the agent has a coherent conception of their emotional state they can use to interact with the en-
vironment (Scherer, 2005). Within an emotional episode feelings are thought to serve a monitor-
ing function, whereby the agent is informed of their current emotional state through querying the 
state of their body (Adolphs, 2005).  The agent may then use the information she has obtained 
about her body state to consciously deliberate on an appropriate action.  For example, if an indi-
vidual walks in on two members of their family committing incest, that individual is able to ob-
serve the nausea they feel, which may cause them to avoid their family members for a period of 
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time.  It is the conscious accessibility of feelings that distinguish them from the other compo-
nents of emotions. While what constitutes an adequate definition of consciousness is hotly debat-
ed, the term is generally taken to refer to the experiences an agent has as a subject differentiated 
from objects and events in the world; a mental process where the subject has a phenomenal 
awareness of their selfhood and is able to execute control over their thoughts (Farthing, 1992; 
Van Gulick, 2011).  As there is a nearly unlimited number of different ways in which an individ-
ual as a subject can interact with different objects in the environment, so too is there diversity in 
the feelings one can experience as a result of an eliciting stimulus. The varieties of subjective 
feelings are proposed to be comprised of experiences of what it is like to be in a particular emo-
tional state as an evaluation of the state of one's body, how that state relates to events in the 
world (i.e the antecedent events of the feeling), and thoughts about the actions to be carried out 
as a consequence of the eliciting event (Lambie & Marcel, 2002).  As feelings are phenomeno-
logical in nature, they are often thought to be what most clearly distinguishes man from machine.  
 
2.2 Contemporary Theories of Emotion 
New theories of emotion emerge on a continual basis, as emotions remain a yet-to-be-
fully-understood class of phenomena.  In this section, I will characterize the following prominent 
theories: basic emotions theory, core affect theory, cognitivism, and feeling theory.  In the pro-
cess of doing so, I hope to make clear how the theories are distinguished from each other in how 
they categorize affective phenomena and which components they emphasize as most integral to 
emotional episodes.   
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2.2.1 Basic Emotions Theory 
Some theorists contend there are a number of discrete emotions, each with their own set 
of associated neurophysiological phenomena (Tomkins, 1962).  The theory of basic emotions 
holds that there is a set of emotions shared by all humans that evolved to deal with ancestral life 
challenges (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1992).  For example, disgust evolved to deal with the challenge 
of avoiding noxious stimuli, and fear evolved to deal with the challenge of avoiding dangers.  
Although the exact number of basic emotions is disputed, happiness, surprise, fear, sadness, an-
ger, and disgust are often thought to comprise the most prototypical basic emotions (see Plutchik, 
1980; Ekman, 1999).  Much of the supporting evidence offered for the theory comes from exper-
iments that show how certain facial expressions are universally associated with specific basic 
emotions, regardless of the observer's cultural background. This universality has a production 
side and a recognition side. On the production side, a particular emotional state is said to elicit a 
facial expression comprised of a fixed set of facial muscles.  For example, Duchenne smiling, 
which involves contraction of the zygomatic major and the orbicularis oculi muscles, is produced 
when one is genuinely happy (Duchenne, 1990; Messinger, Fogel, & Dickson, 2001).  Individu-
als who do not report a state of happiness, but smile voluntarily have been found to be capable of 
only contracting the zygomatic major muscle, not the orbicularis oculi muscle. This finding and 
related results have led some researchers to postulate that emotional expressions are elicited in an 
automatic fashion (Ekman, 1977; Griffiths, 1997).  
On the recognition side, observers are able to infer the emotional state of the emoter, due 
to the direct correspondence between emotional states and the facial expressions they cause. The 
observation that facial expressions can be recognized as corresponding with discrete emotional 
categories cross-culturally, in addition to evidence of differing ANS patterns between emotions 
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(Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen, 1983),  has also led theorists to infer that there are likely neural 
substrates that are particular to each basic emotion (Izard, 1992).  Thus, basic emotions theory 
holds neurophysiological changes and expressions as most definitive of an emotional episode. 
2.2.2 Core Affect Theory 
Others have claimed that emotions should be given a dimensional analysis and be distin-
guished by their state within an affective space constituted by valence (degree of pleasure) and 
arousal (degree of responsiveness to stimuli/wakefulness) dimensions (Barrett & Russell, 2009; 
Fontaine et al., 2007), rather than as discrete or basic emotional categories.
2
  Core affect theory, 
the most prominent theory of this persuasion, dismisses basic emotions as folk psychological 
concepts, and instead proposes emotions should be conceived of as consciously accessible neu-
rophysiological states constituted by a blend of pleasure-displeasure and energization-enervation 
feelings (Russell, 2003).  In addition, one's appraisal of stimuli in the environment is both influ-
enced by and influences one's core affect.  This is to say the more positive one's core affect, the 
more positively events will be perceived and remembered. For instance, an individual in a state 
of positive core affect is more likely to think they made a good impression when meeting a 
stranger than when meeting them in a state of negative core affect (Forgas & Bower, 1987). This 
idea is supported by experimental findings of a mood congruency effect, such as participants' 
ability to recall negatively or positively valenced words with greater accuracy in the correspond-
ing affective state (Knight, Maines, & Robinson, 2002).  Likewise, participants report lower self-
esteem when negative affect is induced and higher self-esteem when positive affect is induced 
(Smith & Petty, 1995).  Russell (2003) proposes affective appraisals of stimuli can also cause 
changes in one's core affect.  For example, the perception that a friend no longer wants to go to 
                                                 
2
 Some theorists have claimed emotions require three or more dimensions to capture all the nuances of emotional 
phenomena (see Fontaine et al., 2007).  
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the movies will likely bring on negative affect.  This induced state of negative affect may then 
lead an individual to perceive others as having a disinterest in interacting with them in the future.  
Thus,  dimensional theories  argue that appraisals of environmental stimuli (including of one's 
self) and the changes to one's core affect these appraisals cause are constitutive of an emotional 
episode.  Furthermore, this core affect need not correspond with or be recognizable as one of the 
basic emotion categories (e.g. happiness, fear, anger, etc.).   
Core affect theory's main criticism of basic emotions theory rests on the observation that 
affective phenomena appear to be both qualitatively and quantitatively diverse.  Russell (2003) 
argues the labels "fear," "anger," "happy," etc., do not capture this diversity.  For instance, one 
might say an individual being chased by an assailant brandishing a knife (Case A), an individual 
who retreats from a cockroach scurrying across the floor (Case B), and an individual who is con-
cerned they will never find a career that is fulfilling (Case C) are all in a state of fear.  On the 
basic emotions account, an emotional episode involves fixed patterns of neurophysiological and 
facial expression changes in response to an eliciting stimulus that are distinct between emotions, 
but are the same within  the same emotional category (Ekman, 1992; Griffiths, 1997; DeLancey, 
2002).  If this were the case, one would expect that the three individuals described above would 
respond to their eliciting stimuli in the same way, yet homogenous responses between the three 
cases seem unlikely. Core affect theorists, in contrast, would argue that the individuals in Cases 
A, B, and C are applying the concept of fear to experience, despite the fact that each individual 
has a unique core affect.  While basic emotion theorists would hold that since all three individu-
als are experiencing fear, they would execute the same cascade of responses to the stimuli, core 
affect theorists would contend this is not the case, as each individual bears a core affective state 
that is distinguished from the other two.  For instance, the individual's arousal in response to an 
15 
armed assailant in Case A should be greater than the individual in Case B's response to a cock-
roach, as the former case poses a threat to their life. As a result, the individual in Case A would 
likely make every effort to escape from the assailant, including trying to negotiate and plead with 
the assailant, while the individual in Case B would be relatively less dedicated to escaping the 
cockroach. In sum, core affect theory is compatible with the differences in the cascade of re-
sponses to eliciting stimuli, while basic emotions theory only allows for a single fixed cascade of 
responses to a given emotion. 
Russell (2003) further criticizes basic emotion theory for failing to account for affect that 
lacks object-directedness (p. 147).  On a basic emotions account, an emotion is thought to have 
an intentional object it is directed towards (e.g. I am angry at you, I am sad Sarah died). Core 
affect theory argues that core affect may not necessarily be aimed at a particular object: for in-
stance, an individual may feel something like anger towards a friend who cancels plans to hang 
out in order to spend time with her boyfriend, or they may experience a similar state of physio-
logical arousal without knowing of anything in particular that has offended them.  Dimensional 
models of emotion, such as core affect theory, are therefore capable of accounting for a wider 
array of affective phenomena than basic emotions theory.   
The greatest difficulty dimensional theories of emotion face is determining the [number 
of] dimensions sufficient for characterizing affective phenomena. Most theorists are in agree-
ment that one dimension is inadequate, as emotions appear to involve degrees of both pleasure-
displeasure as well as activation-inactivation (Feldman-Barrett & Russell, 1999).  Although a 
number of researchers have derived these two dimensions from studies of self-reported feelings, 
and facial expressions (see Russell, 1980, 1991), others have proposed at least two additional 
dimensions, control and unexpectedness, are needed to capture the important similarities and dif-
16 
ferences in emotion-laden words contained across three languages (Fontaine et al., 2007).  On 
their account, appraisals of control result in feelings of power or weakness, which motivate 
tendencies to act or refrain from action (p. 1051). Appraisals of unexpectedness involve deter-
mining whether a stimulus is familiar or novel, the latter of which often prompts individuals to 
socially reference others to determine the appropriate course of action Asch, 1952; Schachter & 
Singer, 1962; Bandura, 1992; Feinman, 1982).  Thus, dimensional theories remain subject to 
skepticism, despite some advantages they provide over basic emotions theory (see Izard, 2007 
and Panksepp, 2007 for further discussion). 
2.2.3 Cognitivism 
The most popular version of cognitivism holds that emotions are special kinds of judg-
ments (Solomon, 1980; Nussbaum, 2001)
3
. On this view, fear of another person, is the judgment 
that the other person is dangerous. Anger is the judgment that one has been offended. Guilt is the 
judgment that one has violated a moral standard one holds.  On the cognitivist account, emotions 
are always "about" a particular intentional object; emotions are not simply feelings. For instance, 
one can be afraid of a stranger approaching, of spiders, or of public speaking, as one may bear 
the propositional attitude that these objects are dangerous, physically or psychologically (Solo-
mon, 2003). Although cognitivists typically hold that feelings alone are not sufficient for having 
emotions, some theorists concede feelings are at least partly constitutive of an emotional episode 
(Solomon, 2003). Whether feelings, desires, or physiological responses comprise emotions is of 
secondary importance within the cognitivist account which contends emotions are essentially 
judgments, which are generally assumed to be conscious but may in principle also be uncon-
scious.  
                                                 
3
 There is a variety of cognitivism that identifies emotions as certain sets of belief and desire pairs (Marks, 1982), 
however this variety is not considered here. 
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One of the primary criticisms of cognitivism is that the rationality of emotions is not 
equivalent to the rationality of beliefs, despite the cognitivist requirement that emotions involve 
propositional attitudes (Ben-Ze'ev, 2000; Goldie, 2000; Elster, 2004). This criticism is closely 
related to a second criticism: emotions can occur despite an apparent lack of judgments/beliefs. 
A person might become afraid when encountering a milk snake, for instance, despite having the 
belief that milk snakes are harmless. In contrast, relatively few people have a fear of driving, de-
spite believing that driving is dangerous. Critics of cognitivism claim the persistence or recalci-
trance of emotions despite conflicting propositional attitudes is sufficient to show emotions are 
not judgments or beliefs (D'Arms and Jacobson, 2003; Brady, 2009; de Sousa, 2013).  
That emotions are judgments about some intentional object is further challenged by the 
occurrence of "blindfright" (Scarantino, 2010).  Blindfright is "the activation of the fear system 
in response to visually presented information registered without awareness" (p. 735), where 
awareness is taken to be the ability to verbally report on the presented information. In priming 
studies where the eliciting stimulus is presented 30 ms before the masking stimulus, participants 
respond to questions about the eliciting stimulus as if they have no awareness of it, yet demon-
strate neurophysiological excitation indicative of fear, such increased skin conductance, startle 
reflex, and amygdala activation (Marcel, 1983).  As the fear system has been shown to be acti-
vated by subliminal stimuli without participants' awareness undermines the cognitivist claim that 
judgments are essential to emotions.  
2.2.4 Feeling Theory 
Feeling theories of emotion share the assumption that emotions are feelings.  As I noted 
above, feelings are commonly defined as conscious subjective perceptions of physical changes in 
one's self in relation to changes in the environment. Feeling theories originated with William 
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James (1884), and later Carl Lange (1885), who held, "the perception of bodily changes, as they 
occur, is the emotion" (James, 1884, p. 188).  On their account, acknowledging that one has been 
offended sets off a cascade of sympathetic nervous system activation (e.g. increased heart rate, 
pupil dilation, etc.), and one's perception of those changes is what constitutes one's anger.  This 
particular feeling theory was later undermined by Cannon (1927) and Bard (1928), who demon-
strated that cats with severed connections between their sympathetic nervous system and central 
nervous system still showed aggressive behavior towards barking dogs.  Further evidence against 
the James-Lange theory includes the fact that the afferent sensory fibers innervating internal or-
gans and glands (i.e. the visceral system) are a tenth of the number of efferent sensory fibers 
(Langley & Anderson, 1894).  Afferent fibers carry information from the sensory receptors of the 
organs and glands to the central nervous system, while efferent fibers send signals to organs and 
glands from the central nervous system.  That there are fewer afferent fibers than efferent fibers 
innervating internal organs and glands suggests that less information is being processed by the 
central nervous system about the current states of these organs and glands than the information 
processed regarding the motor commands send to the organs and glands.  This finding therefore 
provides reason to think awareness of bodily changes is more minimal than James or Lange pro-
posed. Thus, more contemporary feeling theories assume the recognition of physiological re-
sponses to an eliciting event comes after recognizing that one is experiencing an emotion.  
A further problem with feeling theories in general is that emotions are not differentiable 
by their corresponding perceptions of physiological changes alone.  In a seminal study by 
Schachter and Singer (1962), participants were injected with epinephrine and placed in room 
with a confederate who behaved either angrily or playfully with the participant. Results showed 
participants' classification of their own emotional state tended to reflect the confederate's behav-
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ior: participants in the room with the aggressive confederate reported feeling angry, and partici-
pants with the playful confederate reported feeling happy.  This study suggests that perception of 
physiological changes alone is not sufficient to constitute an emotion, as similar physiological 
changes can be shared between emotions.  
Goldie (2009) asserts that the division classical feeling theories have drawn between cog-
nition and feelings is misguided.  On his account, feelings do not pertain only to changes in the 
state of one's body, but can also be about objects in the world outside the body, which is a view 
shared by Lambie & Marcel (2002).  He refers to these types of feelings as feelings towards and 
holds they cannot be separated from cognitive processes. To support this notion, Goldie presents 
a thought experiment involving an ice scientist, Irene, who has never before slipped on ice, but 
has a deep theoretical understanding of how dangerous ice is. Goldie argues that once Irene slips 
on the ice and hurts herself, she will have gained the phenomenological concept that ice is dan-
gerous, where before she only had the theoretical concept that ice is dangerous (p. 234).  While 
Irene previously had the belief that ice was dangerous and the desire to avoid falling on ice, she 
now bears a phenomenological concept of her fear of ice which can neither be reduced to her 
theoretical concept of ice's danger, nor to her bodily feeling alone.  Irene's thoughts and actions 
thus become different from those she would have had she never slipped on the ice, according to 
Goldie.  Therefore, feelings may be said to extend beyond mere perception of bodily sensations 
to include intentionality towards objects in the world that is not reducible to beliefs or desires. 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
There is no consensus on what emotions are, except on the fact that emotions involve a 
set of components. Although the lack of an agreed upon definition for emotions is apparent in the 
contemporary theories of emotion I have characterized here, several themes have emerged which 
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are common to each theory.  For one, emotions are thought to be preceded by an eliciting event 
as appraised by the emoter, such as the noxious odor of vomit or the presence of a threatening 
person ,which encourages an immediate cascade of responses. This contention is held by all 
emotional theories except psychological constructionism (core affect theory), which asserts an 
individual observes a pattern of components and from that infers they are in a particular emo-
tional state (Russell, 2003, p. 152).  Second, the response is determined by the individual's ap-
praisal of the event, whereby the individual determines how the event relates to their sense of 
well-being. Third, the appraisal of the event motivates neurophysiological changes which pre-
pare the individual to execute a particular behavior, in order to modify the individual's relation-
ship to the event.  Finally, some theorists see emotions as involving a subjective experience, 
which allows the individual to reflect on the emotional episode and regulate it. This shared theo-
retical understanding will serve as the working definition of what emotions are throughout the 
course of this thesis.  
 
3   ROBOTIC EMOTIONS 
In order to explore the possibility of robotic emotions, I will consider two robots, Kismet 
and Leonardo. While many robots give the appearance of having emotions by producing expres-
sions recognized as emotional by human observers, Kismet and Leonardo were designed with 
drives that motivate the robots to socially communicate with others, in order to get help satiating 
these drives (Breazeal & Brooks, 2005).  Kismet has three drives which represent the robot's 
needs: a need to be stimulated by toys (stimulation drive), a need to interact with people (social 
drive), and a need to rest (fatigue drive).  The comparisons made between the fulfillment of these 
drives and the robots' appraisal of the current state of the environment is what determines the ro-
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bots' behavioral response. Breazeal claims these comparisons determine the robots' emotive state 
(p. 292), while also noting the robots' emotions are not equivalent to humans'.  Since specifying 
all the details of the robots' affective-cognitive architecture are beyond the scope of this paper, I 
will focus only on denoting the aspects integral to how the robots deliberate on possible behav-
iors, and communicate with human interactants, for the sake of determining whether these robots 
have emotions in Chapter 5. Although the robots have similar architectures, I identify the im-
portant differences that allow Leonardo greater social and affective functionality.  
 
 3.1 Kismet 
 
Figure 3.1. Photograph of the robot Kismet. Photograph taken by Jared C. Benedict on 16 October 2005. Copyright © Jared C. 
Benedict. 
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Kismet is an anthropomorphic robot developed at MIT by Cynthia Breazeal for the pur-
pose of demonstrating how the capacity for face-to-face social interaction can be achieved 
through machines (Breazeal & Brooks, 2005).  The robot was modeled after the interaction style 
between an infant and adult human, Kismet communicates what Breazeal calls its emotive state 
through the prosody of its vocalizations which are pre-linguistic 'babblings,' rather than through 
explicit description of its states as human adults do (Breazeal, 2002; Menzel & D'Aluisio, 2000).   
In addition to vocalizations, Kismet communicates its current state through facial expressions 
and gaze direction.  An object that is brought towards Kismet too rapidly and too close to its 
cameras, for instance, will elicit fear in Kismet who will produce a corresponding facial expres-
sion (Figure 3.2) 
 
Figure 3.2. Kismet expressing fear. Reproduced from http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-group/kismet/kismet.html 
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Kismet's expression resembling fear is typically enough to cause interactants to back 
away from the robot (Breazeal & Brooks, 2005, p. 289). Thus, by indicating intention through its 
facial expressions, Kismet is able to encourage interactants to maintain its state of well-being 
(i.e. a state where its drives are satiated).  
To understand how Kismet's emotive state and subsequent behaviors are generated, con-
sider an example where a toy is presented to Kismet. Before proceeding with the example how-
ever, it is important to note the term "emotive state" is used by Breazeal and her colleagues to 
denote the internal state of the robot which promotes particular facial expression, vocal intona-
tion and posturing (Breazeal & Brooks, 2005).  I will continue to use the term here, without yet 
endorsing the robot as having emotions.   
When Kismet first sees an object, it performs a feature extraction, noting the object's size, 
direction and speed of motion, and color, noting whether that color is within the range of human 
skin tone.  Kismet's cognitive system then assesses these features in conjunction to determine 
whether a toy or person percept should be formed.  An Elmo puppet, for example, is easily clas-
sified as a toy by Kismet, as the object is about a foot tall and brightly-colored.  Percept infor-
mation is then passed on to the robot's affective releasers which further classify the toy as a de-
sired, undesired or threatening stimulus, based both on the percept and on which of Kismet's 
drives are active. Kismet's appraisal module will then assign affective tags to the toy based on 
the robot's current goal, which is again determined by its active drive.  Affective tags are as-
signed values along three dimensions: how stimulating-enervating Kismet finds the object 
(arousal), how attractive-aversive Kismet finds the object (valence), and whether Kismet is in-
clined to withdraw from or approach the object (stance).  A toy that is bright-colored and moving 
slow enough for Kismet to easily track will likely get coded as a desired stimulus by Kismet's 
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affective releasers, particularly if Kismet's stimulation drive is active. If the toy is desired, it will 
likely receive moderately high appraisal tags for arousal, valence (positive), and stance (ap-
proach). In contrast, Kismet's affective system will likely code the toy as undesired if its drive 
for rest is active, and will further appraise the toy with lower values for arousal, valence (nega-
tive), and stance (withdraw).  A toy that is presented such that it crowds Kismet's cameras will be 
coded as a threatening stimulus, causing the toy to be appraised with high arousal, low valence 
and low stance (withdraw) values. The net values of the appraisal tags will then be passed on to 
emotion elicitors, which would then initiate an emotive state - happiness in the first case, disgust 
in the second, and fear in the third.  
Once what Breazeal calls happiness is activated, Kismet will then display a facial expres-
sion that maps onto the valence, arousal, and stance values appraised of the stimulus (see Figure 
3).  Although Breazeal explicitly states "Kismet's emotive system is strongly inspired by various 
theories of basic emotions" (p. 293), she also asserts, "Inspired by [Smith & Scott's (1997) theory 
of facial expressions], Kismet's facial expressions are generated using an interpolation-based 
technique over a three-dimensional affect space" (p. 282).  Breazeal adds the dimension of stance 
to the traditional two-dimensional model, which roughly parallels the dimension of control Fon-
taine and his colleagues (2007) posit, as appraisals along these dimensions are said to motivate 
agents to approach or withdraw from a stimulus. According to Breazeal, the stance dimension 
characterizes how approachable or repulsive Kismet finds the stimulus (p. 300). Stance is distin-
guished from valence, which corresponds with how favorable Kismet appraises the stimulus to 
be, though the researchers concede that both dimensions tend to increase/decrease in accordance 
with each other.  On her view, there are nine basic facial expressions that span this affect space, 
though other expressions can be produced that resemble a blend of two or more basic expres-
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sions. One might say the model of emotions employed in Kismet was constructed with the tacit 
assumption that basic emotions are particularly recognizable or common positions within the af-
fective space constituted by these three dimensions.  From a dynamical systems perspective, 
basic emotions could be conceived of as attractors within this affective space.  While Breazeal 
endorses basic emotions theory, it is clear Kismet’s model of emotions hybridizes elements from 
both basic emotions theory and dimensional theory (core affect theory). 
 
Figure 3.3. Kismet's facial expressions corresponding with recognizable emotions. By "Tired", Breazeal means Kismet is in an 
emotive state more commonly referred to as boredom. Reproduced from http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-
group/kismet/kismet.html 
As Kismet's emotive state is constituted by appraisal along valence, arousal, and stance 
dimensions, changes within the state space result in coordinated changes in Kismet's expressions.  
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For instance, as arousal increases, Kismet's ears move upwards, while its mouth and eyes widen. 
Likewise, as arousal declines, Kismet's ears sink down, its mouth closes, and its eyes shut.  
When a desired toy is first presented to Kismet, the robot's ears will perk up, and its mouth and 
eyes will widen with interest, as shown in Figure 3 above.  However, after the interactant uses 
the toy to play with Kismet for an extended period of time, Kismet will attenuate to the stimulus 
(i.e. its fatigue drive will become active), such that it finds the toy less arousing, and will pro-
duce an expression of tiredness. In this way, Kismet's expressions remain synchronized with its 
emotive state and active drives. 
As Kismet is an anthropomorphic robot with facial features similar to humans, its emo-
tional state can be inferred even by the naïve human observer (Breazeal & Brooks, 2005; 
Breazeal & Scassellati, 1999).  Breazeal states "…Kismet's expressive behavior is effective be-
cause it is readily understandable and predictable to the person who interacts with it. This fol-
lows from the fact that Kismet's emotive responses are modeled after basic emotions that are 
universally understood by people (Ekman, 1992)," (Breazeal & Brooks, 2005, p. 303).  In a cer-
tain sense, Kismet's emotive state is more transparent to an observer than a human's, as Kismet 
forms no intentions for deception; all of its expressions are directly correlated with its current 
emotive state and its intention to satisfy active drives. Through the transparency of its emotive 
state, Kismet is able to encourage human interaction in order to fulfill the robot's goals.  
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3.2 Leonardo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Photograph of Leonardo.  Reproduced from http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/robotics-software/leonardo 
Leonardo, another social robot developed by Cynthia Breazeal and her colleagues, bears 
an affective-cognitive architecture that is similar to Kismet's (Breazeal, 2003).  Unlike Kismet, 
however, Leonardo has a torso with operating arms and hands with which it is able to complete 
tasks, such as memory tasks involving button pressing or assembling blocks (Berlin, Gray, 
Thomaz, & Breazeal, 2006).  The robot is also more sophisticated in its social interactions, as it 
is capable of recognizing the emotional states of its human interactants through an implementa-
tion of simulation theory (Thomaz, Berlin, & Breazeal, 2011).  Like human infants, the robot 
learns to understand its interactant's emotional state by imitating their facial expressions 
(Meltzoff, 1996), which incites in Leonardo an emotional state corresponding with the expres-
sion produced.  If the robot observes a human interactant upturning the corners of its mouth and 
forming wrinkles at the corners of her eyes, Leonardo will execute motor changes that replicate 
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this facial configuration. Feedback from Leonardo's face is signaled to the robot's emotive sys-
tem, which informs the robot that it is happy. Thus the robot is able to form the belief that the 
human interactant is currently happy. 
 The interactant first teaches Leonardo to recognize her facial expressions by imitating 
Leonardo's facial expressions. Once Leonardo has learned a mapping of its own facial features to 
those of its interactant, the robot can then imitate the interactant's facial expression by blending 
features of its seven basic facial expressions to reach an expression closest to the interactant's. 
When Leonardo produces a facial expression, an output signal is sent to its affective system 
which activates the emotional state that corresponds with that expression. As the robot's affective 
system is based on Kismet's affective system, Leonardo tags perceptual and internal states with 
valence (positive or negative) and arousal (high or low) tags, which bias its attention to-
ward/away from particular stimuli and motivate subsequent behavior. In addition, the robot is 
able to assign novelty values to the stimulus, based off whether that stimulus has been appraised 
in the past or not. Thus, by imitating an interactant's facial expression, Leonardo is able to induce 
an emotional state within itself analogous to the interactant's, such that the robot is able to under-
stand the interactant's behavior in much same way that humans do.  
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Figure 3.5 Leonardo reaching for a toy while expressing interest. Screenshot taken from 
http://www.ted.com/talks/cynthia_breazeal_the_rise_of_personal_robots.html 
 
4   CAN ROBOTS HAVE EMOTIONS WITHOUT FEELINGS? 
As we have seen, Breazeal and her colleagues openly state that Kismet and Leonardo 
have emotions, albeit in a more limited sense than humans do.  How are we to interpret their 
claims?  I will distinguish two conflicting positions on whether robotic emotions could exist 
which I will refer to simply as the "Unemotional Robots View (URV)" and the "Emotional Ro-
bots View (ERV)." The core claims of URV are that robots cannot have emotions, because they 
cannot have feelings and feelings are necessary for having emotions. I will reject this argument 
as inconclusive, and defend ERV instead by specifying in what sense robots like Kismet and Le-
onardo have emotions. At the same time, I will acknowledge that there are important differences 
between human and robotic emotions, namely that robots currently lack any sort of subjective 
feelings. In addition, Kismet and Leonardo's emotional capacities parallel those of human in-
fants, and thus lack  I will support ERV, and provide arguments against URV, which holds feel-
ings are necessary for having emotions.  I conclude with a discussion of how Kismet and Leo-
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nardo bear the necessary components for having emotions in a functional sense, and the ways in 
which their emotions differ from humans.   
 
4.1 The Unemotional Robots View 
Critics of affective computing have claimed robots will only ever be capable of the ap-
pearance of having emotions on the grounds that robots do not and may never have subjective 
feelings (Picard, 1997; Velik, 2010; Turkle, 2010; Feil-Seifer & Matric, 2011).  This view per-
meates both the academic community and popular culture, as the possibility of machines having 
the capacity to feel sorrow after the loss of a close friend, or to feel fear about death, clashes with 
the notion that machines obey a fixed set of mechanistic instructions.  While robots and virtual 
agents can certainly give the impression they have emotions through producing expressions in-
dicative of an emotional state, Adolphs argues "such constructions would be rather limited and 
susceptible to breakdown of various kinds" (2005, p. 10).  That a robot is capable of producing 
behaviors often classified as emotional, such as smiling, frowning, retreating from intense stimu-
li, etc., is not sufficient reason for thinking the robot has emotions, according to Adolphs.  He 
states, "Behavior, physiological response, and feeling causally affect one another; and none of 
them in isolation is to be identified with the emotion, although we certainly use observations of 
them to infer an emotional state" (p. 16). Although 'feeling' is a notoriously difficult term to de-
fine, Adolphs (2005) describes a feeling as "one (critical) aspect of our conscious experience of 
emotions, the aspect that makes us aware of the state of our body - and through it, often the state 
of another's body" (p. 21).  Feelings thus serve a monitoring function where the agent conscious-
ly recognizes their emotional state and uses it to make inferences about how that state relates to 
the environment. For a robot to have feelings, it must replicate "the relevant internal details at a 
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level below that of radio transmitters but above that of actual organic molecules" (p. 12).  Alt-
hough Adolphs concedes affective science is still unsure what these relevant internal mecha-
nisms are (p. 12),  he posits the mechanism should be capable of maintaining a self-model that is 
recursively updated in response to new information in the environment and available to other 
cognitive processes.  
Adolphs (2005) contends the view that feelings are not necessary for defining emotions is 
problematic for two reasons: First, if feelings are no longer part of our conception of emotions, 
then there is little way of telling which behaviors were onset by a particular emotion, according 
to Adolphs.  He contends that since any number of behaviors could be enacted when one is in a 
given emotional state, it would be difficult to say whether such a state was present without feel-
ings to serve as a reliable indicator of that state. Adolphs is apt to note that behavioral equiva-
lence between two individuals does not guarantee internal equivalence; there is an indeterminate 
number of different behaviors that could be carried out as the result of an emotion, say anger, 
such as by cursing an offending party, physically assaulting that party, or even silently seething 
in the confines of one's bedroom.  It is also possible for two individuals to behave the same way, 
despite having different emotions.  For instance, Cathy may cry because her favorite pet has 
passed away, or because she is overwhelmed by having just won the lottery.  As two or more in-
dividuals could execute the same kinds of behavior while bearing distinct internal states, 
Adolphs maintains an account of emotion must include experience of emotions, since this expe-
rience gives an indication of why the behavior was performed.  With regard to robots,  it is en-
tirely possible for them to execute behaviors that appear emotional, such as fleeing from a threat-
ening stimulus, without undergoing an emotional state. Thus, Adolphs holds feelings are a neces-
sary component of emotions.    
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Second, Adolphs claims by leaving considerations of conscious experience out of the 
components necessary for constructing an emotional robot, one is committed to a behaviorist ac-
count (p. 10).   Once a strict behaviorist perspective on emotions is adopted, feelings are no 
longer attributed any causal power over the agent's action selection.  He argues this cannot be the 
case, as feelings serve two clear functions: 1) to monitor one's current emotional state so that one 
can take action to regulate it, and 2) to empathize with others so as to understand their emotional 
state.  Adolphs likens feelings to a means for obtaining information about one's own emotional 
state, by serving as representations of one's physiological changes and how they correspond with 
changes in the environment (p. 21).  If one registers an experience of disgust after smelling fish, 
for instance, then one is likely to consciously avoid consuming fish in the future.  In addition, 
research supports the theory that people understand another's emotional state by simulating that 
emotional state within themselves (Adolphs, 2002; Jeannerod, 2005).  Studies have demonstrated 
that observing the facial expression of another can cause changes in one's feelings (Schneider, 
Gur, Gur & Muenz, 1994; Wild, Erb, & Bartels, 2001).  By experiencing another person's emo-
tion, one's subsequent actions become attuned to the social circumstances. For instance, if Gerry 
makes a comment about Annette that causes her to furrow her brow and clench her fists, Gerry 
may recognize she is angered by his comment by simulating Annette's emotional state using his 
observations of her body state.  On his account, feeling empathy towards another involves repre-
senting the physiological changes of another person, which helps one to understand their emo-
tional state.  As feelings allow one to monitor the emotional state of one's self and others, and 
constitute the experiential aspect of emotions, Adolphs believes feelings are necessary for an 
agent to have emotions proper. According to Adolphs, a robot could " have emotions in a narrow 
sense in the absence of feelings. However, such constructions would always be rather limited and 
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susceptible to breakdown of various kinds" (p. 10).  What Adolphs means to say is that without 
feelings, robots that are capable of convincingly reproducing the facial expressions, posturing 
and behaviors that are indicative of emotions in humans will eventually reveal that these expres-
sions and behaviors were designed with the intent of fooling humans into believing the robots 
have emotions, when in fact their actions are just mediated by a set of clever algorithms (p. 18).  
Adolphs reasons that since these capacities for expression and behavior associated with emotion 
are explicitly built into the robots, that there likely is some unanticipated situation(s) in which the 
system responsible for generating convincing responses to social situations will fail, showing 
that the robot was merely simulating emotion. 
Adolphs presents yet another criticism of robotic emotions: even if the robots were to ex-
ecute behaviors that corresponded with what would be expected of a human in a similar scenario, 
the robot would still lack the biological, and more specifically, neurological underpinnings that 
produce those behaviors in humans (2005, p. 12-13).  A robot that was able to fool an interroga-
tor on the Turing Test into thinking it was a human still would not necessarily possess the inter-
nal mechanisms that would have produced those same responses by a human on the test.  With-
out undergoing physiological changes that are roughly equivalent to humans' during an emotion, 
Adolphs asserts robots cannot have emotions.  While Adolphs does not explicitly state that ro-
botic emotions are impossible, it is clear he thinks building a robot with an internal structure ca-
pable of replicating human physiological changes and changes of feeling is highly implausible.  
Arbib (2005) espouses a similar position to Adolphs:  He states that while robots may be 
able to make emotional appraisals, they cannot experience the "heat" of subjective feelings, since 
they lack any foundation in biological evolution (p. 374). While Arbib does not provide an ex-
plicit definition, his discussion suggests "heat" is the visceral experience aspect of emotion ena-
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bled by the particulars of human biology. Arbib believes it is highly unlikely robots will ever be 
designed to experience this aspect of emotions, due in part to the difficulties inherent in replicat-
ing the biological system(s) necessary for feeling.  A similar criticism is furthered by Velik 
(2010) who holds that robots will always lack emotions unless their physical implementation in-
cludes a visceral system analogous to humans'.  On her account, a robot's perception of a change 
in its body does not qualify as a feeling; the robot must experience the sensation of a bodily 
change in the way humans do.  According to Velik, robots will lack emotions until a human-like 
visceral system is integrated in the robots' physical implementation.  
 Arbib also sees robotic feelings as implausible due to the difference in ecological niche 
between robots and humans.  Like all biological life, humans are thought to be motivated by the 
four Fs: feeding, fighting, fleeing and reproduction (Pribram, 1960).  Robots, in contrast, are not 
impelled by these drives, and need not be, as these machines are presumably engineered with 
other functions besides replicating all aspects of living organisms in mind. Rather than survival, 
the robots' most basic drives will be tailored to the specific tasks they are designed for.  Arbib 
also notes many robots do not have control and sensory systems that are able to recognize human 
emotional expressions, and are thus incapable of empathy.  As empathy allows one to recognize 
and understand another's emotional state, many emotion theorists take empathy to be a necessary 
capacity for having emotions at all (Stueber, 2006). Although Arbib is noncommittal about 
whether a robot lacking empathy could be said to have emotions, it is apparent he does not be-
lieve they can in any deep sense.  
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4.2 The Emotional Robots View 
Adolphs is apt to note that just because two agents behave in the same way does not 
guarantee that the internal mechanisms controlling their behavior are identical (2005, p. 12). As 
behavior does not guarantee the presence of a particular mechanism that generates it, Adolphs 
asserts that observation of behavior normally associated with emotion  is not sufficient to con-
clude the agent has emotions.  Nevertheless, behaviors do provide a useful heuristic for estimat-
ing another's emotional state, even if they cannot guarantee accuracy.  When someone is an-
gered, for example, they will typically engage in aggressive behavior in retaliation to the offense 
committed against them.  An angered individual who smiled at the person who had insulted them 
and offered to shake their hand would be in conflict with what anger is conceived to be: a retalia-
tive response to a perceived offense (Videbeck, 2006). Although aggressive behavior is more 
commonly recognized as associated with anger, withdrawal behaviors can also follow an ap-
praisal that leads to anger (Novaco, 1986). These two types of behavior give the observer an ini-
tial indication of the emotional state of the person they are observing.  As Adolphs would likely 
note, however, fear has also been shown to elicit withdrawal behavior as well (Buss et al., 2003). 
How then can emotional state be inferred?  I argue there are two other contributory ways for de-
termining an agent's emotional state: by observing their expressions and by observing their neu-
rophysiological changes to a stimulus. Of course, robots do not have neurophysiology, as they 
are not biological
4
, so robots must be constructed with systems analogous to the neurophysiolog-
ical systems of humans.  The question that then follows is this: How similar must the control sys-
tem (i.e. the robot's 'nervous system') and body of the robot be in order for the robot in question 
to have emotions comparable to human emotions? The answer to this question, I argue, is that 
                                                 
4
 It is possible for hybrid agents with both biological and artificial components comprising their control system and 
body to exist (i.e. cyborgs), and in fact, these sorts of agents already do exist (e.g. in individuals with pacemakers or 
neuroprosthetics).  However, I will not consider these sorts of agents in this thesis.  
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the robot's control system and body must consistently prepare the robot for the same sorts of ac-
tion tendencies that human neurophysiology prepares humans for, such that observations of con-
trol system and bodily changes reliably indicate emotional appraisals and behavior.   
Before determining how changes in the control systems and bodies of robots designate 
emotions, let us first consider how facial expressions and neurophysiological changes serve as 
reliable indicators of emotional states in humans. As Paul Ekman (1971, 1993, 1997) has argued, 
there is evidence to suggest there are particular facial expressions that correspond with particular 
emotions, and that these facial expressions can be recognized cross-culturally.  If this is the case, 
then we are able to distinguish an individual who is afraid from an individual who is angry, as 
the facial expressions characterizing the respective emotions are markedly distinct.  Anger and 
fear share common physiological responses, such as elevated heart rate and increase in perspira-
tion (Ekman, 2004), though differ in the level of neuromodulators observed during the respective 
emotional states (Novaco, 2000).  Norepinephrine is more strongly activated during anger than 
epinephrine, while epinephrine is the more dominant neuromodulator during fear. In addition, 
neuroimaging studies have found the lateral orbitofrontal cortex to be the brain structure most 
commonly implicated in anger (Portegal & Stemmler, 2010), while the amygdala are argued to 
play the central role in fear processing
5
 (LeDoux, 2002; Olsson & Phelps, 2007). Taken together, 
observations of behaviors, expressions and neurophysiological changes provide an indicator of 
the observed individual's emotional state, without needing to speculate on that individual's sub-
jective experience. Thus, Adolph’s first criticism can be dismissed as applied to humans.  
How then can bodily changes and facial expressions of robots serve as reliable indicators 
of emotional states in robots?  This question raises the further question of what role bodily 
changes play in the emotions of humans. As was established in Chapter Two, bodily changes fol-
                                                 
5
 The amygdala have also been implicated in anger, as well as a number of other emotions (Phelps & LeDoux, 2005) 
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low from an appraisal of a salient stimulus in order to prepare the agent for action (Scherer, 
2005).  Likewise, the robot's appraisal of a given stimulus should elicit a cascade of bodily 
changes in order to prepare the robot for an action that is an appropriate response to the appraisal 
(i.e. a response that will assist the robot in reaching its goal). Furthermore, there should be 
unique cascades of bodily changes for each of the robot's emotions, as is the case with humans. 
So long as these conditions for bodily changes are fulfilled, the physical differences in how bodi-
ly changes occur between robots and humans are irrelevant, as bodily changes would serve as 
reliable indicators of emotion in both types of agents.  In addition, the emotional robots should 
have facial expressions that both correspond with their emotional state and that are easily recog-
nizable to humans as indicative of those emotional states.  As there are no apparent physical 
limitations on designing these sort of robots, Adolphs' first criticism may also be dismissed as 
applied to robots.  
Adolphs' second criticism misses a critical distinction between the conception of emotion 
held by theorists in agreement with Fellous and LeDoux (2005), and the behaviorist position 
when he equates the two positions: the approach to understanding emotions proposed by Fellous 
and LeDoux, Rolls, and like-minded researchers relies on observations of neurophysiological 
state, expressions, and behavioral changes in order to draw conclusions about the agent's emo-
tional state.   In contrast, the behaviorist simply refers back to the agent's past responses to par-
ticular stimuli in order to predict future behavior (Graham, 2010). The behaviorist argues inner 
states of the agent should not be used to explain a given behavior, as the behaviorist is committed 
to the notion that external factors (i.e. the environment) determine behavior. As cognitive neuro-
scientists postulating on how the brain structures implicated in emotional processing relate to 
attention, memory, and other processes, Fellous and LeDoux are certainly far from committed to 
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anything resembling behaviorism; in fact, they maintain an opposing position. The approach they 
espouse claims emotions should be understood as largely unconscious processes originating in 
well-defined neural circuitries. Thus, Adolphs mischaracterizes the position of Fellous, LeDoux, 
Rolls and like-minded researchers when he states they define emotion as "behavior without con-
scious experience" (2005, p. 27).   
In humans, feelings do appear to serve the function of monitoring changes in one's emo-
tional state over time relative to environmental events as Adolphs suggests. However, this is not 
sufficient reason to think such a monitoring function is necessary in order for an agent to achieve 
its goals or to maintain a state of well-being. Breazeal argues Kismet's "emotive system is re-
sponsible for perceiving and recognizing internal and external events with affective value, as-
sessing and signaling this value to other systems, regulating and biasing the cognitive system to 
promote appropriate and flexible decision making, and communicating the robot’s internal state 
(p. 292)." None of the robot's deliberation on action selection is conscious; the selection of a be-
havior for execution is determined by an algorithm which evaluates the particular behavior that 
has received the most activation from Kismet's active drive and emotive state.  For instance, if 
Kismet's drive for rest is active and a human interactant presents a toy to the robot, Kismet's 
emotive state corresponding with disgust will activate, causing the robot to turn up the corner of 
its mouth and turn away from the toy. This informs the human interactant Kismet is not interest-
ed in playing. Thus Kismet fulfills its drive to rest. This however brings up the question of 
whether it is appropriate for Breazeal to refer to the internal state of Kismet as an "emotive 
state."  If Breazeal is correct in referring to Kismet's internal state as an emotive one, as I argue 
in the next section, then it would appear as if it is entirely possible for robots to achieve their 
goals and maintain a state of well-being without conscious deliberation.  
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While Adolphs (2005) and Arbib (2005) are right to note the lack of biological grounding 
apparent in most current robots (see Warwick et al., 2010, for discussion of a robot-rat brain hy-
brid),  there is no principled reason to think biological materials are the only materials capable of 
producing the functions emotions serve. If we are committed to the physicalist notion that all 
psychological phenomena originate from the interaction of physical entities (Stoljar, 2009), then 
there appears to be nothing contradictory in asserting the possibility of designing mechanisms 
that reproduce emotions in robots, even artificial feelings, so long as researchers and engineers 
have a sufficient understanding of what interactions need to occur between the agent's body and 
the environment for such phenomena to arise. This is not to deny the challenges inherent in rep-
licating something as intricate as the human visceral system, but rather to acknowledge its physi-
cal possibility. Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent robots would have to have a physical 
implementation parallel to the human body in order to have emotions, despite Arbib (2005) and 
Velik's (2010) insistence. While I concede emotions are exceptionally complex processes, there 
are a number of sophisticated functions and abilities that can be performed by entities with little 
resemblance to each other: a human chess player might use associative memory to recognize 
how the current state of the board resembles a board state of a previous game and choose a move 
based on what worked (or did not work) in the previous game. In contrast, a computer player will 
likely employ an algorithmic search for a move that has the greatest probability of minimizing 
the possibility of an opponent checkmating them (Shannon, 1950).  Unless the goal is to model 
human emotions with all the exact biological details, then the possibility that emotions could be 
functionally realized is closer in reach than thought by proponents of the URV. 
Arbib's (2005) contention robots should have empathy to be considered emotional is en-
dorsed by Scherer (2010) who argues an agent is competent in perceiving emotions when she can 
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recognize another's emotional state through observations across several sensory modalities (i.e. 
face, posture, vocal intonation, verbal content), despite some cues being hidden from the observ-
er (p. 8).  While many theorists assume subjective feelings are necessary for having empathy, 
Damiano and colleagues (2011) argue empathic relations can be achieved between humans and 
robots, so long as the emotional states between these agents are coordinated.  By coordinated, 
she means the emotional expression of one agent influences the expression displayed by the oth-
er agent in an exchange, and vice versa. For instance, an enraged individual who confronts their 
housemate for never completing household chores might evoke a startled expression in the 
housemate who was not expecting the dispute. The housemate's expression may shift to guilt af-
ter realizing their neglect, which in turn could cause the angered individual to soften to a more 
neutral expression.  Damiano asserts emotional expression is an ongoing process in humans that 
is not caused by a feeling, but rather precedes feelings, as some have contended (Dumouchel, 
2008).  The central idea is humans are embodied in the environment such that their emotional 
expressions are contingent upon their interaction with a communicative partner, particularly the 
partner's own expressions; emotions are thus relational processes as their formation requires first 
observing an agent or event for the emotions to be directed towards.  Damiano and colleagues 
conclude a robot that is able to coordinate a human's expressions through its own expressions, 
and is likewise influenced by human expressions in a reactive fashion has the necessary capaci-
ties for artificial empathy.  
Damiano and colleagues are right in asserting the emotional expressions of others directly 
influence the expressions one produces as a consequence. When Agent A starts rapidly ap-
proaching Agent B with a fixed stare and furrowed eyebrows, Agent B either takes action to 
avoid the oncoming aggressor or else Agent B matches Agent A's level of aggression. In either 
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case, the fact that Agent A has expressed aggression towards Agent B necessitates Agent B send-
ing a reciprocal message back to Agent A.  We would suspect a deficiency in the emotional ca-
pacities of an individual who, for example, did not return a smile when smiled at by others, or 
who displayed a blank stare and replied in a monotone voice when verbally berated, since hu-
mans are inclined to respond to another's expressions. What is more, there is reason to think the-
se exchanges in affective expression are reflexive to one's emotional state.  Ekman (1997) holds 
that once an affect program (i.e. a preprogrammed, automatic response to relevant events both 
shared and unique across cultures (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)) is initiated, the corresponding faci-
al muscles are directly stimulated, meaning these facial muscles will contract every time the af-
fect program activates (p. 324).  Although individuals may attempt to suppress expressions by 
imposing voluntary control on their face, Ekman maintains they cannot prevent the neurological 
signals from being sent to the corresponding facial nerves of the expression.  This is not to sug-
gest that Agent B has a fixed expressive response to Agent A's display of aggression, or that all 
other agents will respond with the same expressions as Agent B.  This is rather to contend that 
expressions are displays produced as reactions to another’s actions or expressions, which bear 
information both about the expresser's social intentions (Fridlund, 1997) and their emotional 
state (Ekman, 1997).  A robot that is capable of recognizing and classifying the emotional state 
of a human, and as a result is able to tune its own expressions to match those of a healthy human, 
should be said to function in a socially-appropriate way. As Leo is able to adjust its expressions 
in this manner through imitating human interactants (Breazeal, Buchsbaum, & Gray, 2009; Ber-
lin, Gray, Thomaz, & Breazeal, 2006), and using them to social reference (Thomaz, Berlin, & 
Breazeal, 2005), Adolphs and Arbib's criticisms appear unsubstantiated. 
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From the account of expressional exchanges provided above, it appears as if an individual 
can have an unconscious emotion in the absence of a feeling. However, a critic of this position 
might assert that feelings are still present within an emotional episode, even if one is not able to 
sense them.  In response to this discrepancy,  Lacewing (2007) organizes the positions held on 
the relationship between unconscious emotions and feelings into three groups.  The first group 
holds that unconscious emotions do involve conscious feelings.  Ben-Ze'ev (2000) and Green-
span (1988) maintain that individuals are aware of a conscious feeling during an unconscious 
emotion, but do not understand the connection between the emotion and the feeling.  In contrast, 
Goldie (2000) asserts that unconscious emotions are consciously felt, despite that the individual 
remains unaware of the conscious feeling. The second group deny that unconscious emotions 
require feelings at all. Nussbaum (2001) argues that emotions are effectively judgments that do 
not involve any non-cognitive processes, such as feelings. Roberts (2003) defines feelings as 
immediate perceptions of one's self as being in a certain emotional state, but contends emotions 
need not be consciously recognized.  On his view, feelings do not occur when the emotions they 
correspond with could be psychologically damaging, or else masking feelings are elicited that 
distract from the emotion (e.g. feelings of superiority to mask fear of failure [Lacewing, 2007, p. 
95]). The third group contends unconscious emotions have unconscious feelings.  Gardner 
(1993) and Wollheim (1984) defend this position on the grounds that emotions are useful to us 
only if they are felt. These authors argue that the experience of a mental state and its representa-
tional content are inseparable, yet their presence need not be detected by consciousness  in order 
to persist.  As these three accounts appear equally plausible from his perspective, Lacewing con-
cludes no answer to the question of how feelings relate to unconscious emotions yet exists.  
However, since we are able to provide an explanation for how an unconscious emotion alone can 
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moderate social interactions and select appropriate actions, I argue feelings are not necessary for 
characterizing unconscious emotions.  
There are a number of researchers who hold that feelings are too poorly understood to be 
included within the broader definition of emotion at all.  In addition, many theorists do not con-
sider feelings strictly necessary for having emotions.  Fellous and LeDoux (2005) insist the study 
of emotions should remain focused on the neurophysiological aspects of emotion that are well-
defined, such as the circuits implicated in emotional processing related to fear (p. 105).  Within a 
fear conditioning paradigm, subjects are presented with a painful unconditioned stimulus (e.g. a 
foot shock) immediately following a neutral conditioned stimulus (e.g. a tone), such that they 
learn to fear the conditioned stimulus when it is presented in isolation. The researchers are then 
able to operationalize the test subject's fear through measurements of blood pressure, freezing 
responses, pituitary-adrenal stress hormones and activation of the specific processing circuits 
implicated in fear (p. 87). Through these studies, LeDoux and colleagues have found the amyg-
dala to play a central role in the coordination of fear responses, particularly through signals out-
put to the brainstem. Fellous and LeDoux argue a greater understanding of the neural circuitry 
involved in facilitating fear responses enacted by the body could provide insight into how a 
"fearful" robot might be constructed.   
 Feelings are exceedingly difficult to study empirically as subjective experience cannot be 
directly observed.  If feelings are necessary in order to say an agent has emotions, then the ques-
tion of whether nonhuman animals have emotions remains unanswered, as researchers have no 
means of accessing these creatures' phenomenology (LeDoux, 2002).  This is to say, if an organ-
ism's subjective experience cannot be directly observed, then we have deficient grounds for 
knowing whether the organism actually underwent such an experience. While we cannot be cer-
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tain our fellow humans have subjective experience based on this conditional, we have sufficient 
reason for believing a friend is actually excited about an upcoming concert, for instance, because 
they are able to describe their excitement at various levels of detail.  If pressed to explain why 
they are excited about the concert, the friend may say they enjoy the style of music the perform-
ers will play, the fact that other friends will be present, and that there will be an after-party fol-
lowing the show.  This is not to suggest individuals' introspective accounts of their feelings are 
entirely veridical, however. On the contrary, a number of studies have shown people to be incon-
sistent in reports about their motivations for a particular behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wil-
son, 2002; Pronin, 2009).  A recent experiment (Johansson, Hall, Sikström, & Olsson, 2005) 
demonstrated 74% of participants failed to detect when a choice they made had been switched 
for another option.  Furthermore, participants provided confabulated accounts for why they made 
a choice they never actually made.  This failure to detect changes in choices one has made, 
known as choice blindness, was found for choices of facial attractiveness (Johansson, Hall, 
Sikström, & Olsson, 2005; Johansson, Hall, Sikström, Tarning & Lind, 2006), tea and jam pref-
erence (Hall, Johansson, Tärning, Sikström, & Deutgen,  2010), and moral judgments (Hall, Jo-
hansson, & Strandberg, 2012).  Such findings undermine the assumption that introspection pro-
vides accurate accounts of one's subjective experience. That said, the fact humans are able to 
provide these sorts of accounts at all differentiates them from other animals for whom we have 
only physiological and behavioral measures to assess their mental state.  Thus, while subjective 
feelings appear to be a part of human emotions, we do not yet have a clear enough understanding 
of feelings to assume they are necessary for any agent to have emotions.  
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5    ROBOTS CAN HAVE EMOTIONS 
Thus far, I have provided rebuttals to the existing arguments for why robots cannot have 
emotions, focusing in particular on dismissing the claim that robots cannot have emotions be-
cause emotions require feelings, which robots cannot possess. My critique of this Unemotional 
Robots View has relied on an analysis of the positions defended by Adolphs (2005), Arbib 
(2005), and on the literature on unconscious emotion that evaluates the role of feelings in emo-
tions.  In this section, I will argue robots can have emotions, and in fact, Kismet and Leonardo 
already do.  As all contemporary theories of emotion remain subject to unanswered criticism as I 
illustrated in Chapter 1, I propose that the best way of understanding emotions is through the 
component process model of emotions developed by Scherer.  This theory builds upon the con-
sensus among theories as to what components comprise emotions, despite the emphasis these 
theories place on particular components.  The component process model of emotions also pro-
vides a clear advantage over other theories of emotion as it accommodates for the wide variety of 
ways in which emotions are instantiated.  Most importantly, the component process model al-
lows for the conclusion that robots can have emotions even if they do not have feelings, as only a 
majority of the components of emotion need be present within an emotional episode on this ac-
count.  I will then demonstrate that Kismet and Leonardo both instantiate emotion through four 
of the five components: appraisals, physiological changes, expressions and action tendencies.  I 
will also briefly discuss the additional features of Leonardo that allow the robot to form beliefs 
about others' intentions with which the robot can perform social and task learning. I conclude 
with a discussion of what Kismet and Leonardo's capacities mean to the possibility of robots 
having emotions at large and suggest future directions for exploring affective computing.  
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5.1 Component Process Model of Emotions 
As stated earlier, most theorists and affective scientists are in agreement on the compo-
nents that comprise emotions, despite the fact that no consensus has emerged on what emotions 
are. The component process model of emotions (Scherer, 1987; 2000; 2005; 2010b) characterizes 
emotions as a series of coordinated responses driven by an appraisal of the environment across 
multiple objectives. Scherer states an "emotion is defined as an episode of interrelated, synchro-
nized changes in the states of all or most of the five organismic subsystems in response to the 
evaluation of an external or internal stimulus event as relevant to major concerns of the organism 
(Scherer, 1987, 2001)."  On Scherer's account, the states of the subsystems he refers to are the 
components of emotion: cognitive appraisal, neurophysiological changes, action tendencies, ex-
pressions and feelings (2005, 2010b).  The sorts of responses executed by the coordination by the 
components depend upon how salient internal and external stimuli are appraised across multiple 
objectives. The first appraisal objective is to determine how relevant a given stimulus is to the 
agent or other members of its group (2010b, p. 51).  Satisfaction of this objective includes checks 
for the novelty and intrinsic pleasantness of the stimulus, in addition to its relevance to the 
agent's goals and needs. The second related objective is to evaluate how the stimulus might af-
fect the agent's survival, well-being and long-term goals. To meet this objective, the agent ap-
praises the sorts of causes and probable outcomes of a given stimulus and assesses whether deal-
ing with it is a high or low priority. Third, the agent appraises the ways she could cope with the 
stimulus and what the consequences of such actions would be. This appraisal motivates the ac-
tion tendencies the agent will later carry out. The final appraisal objective is to determine how 
the stimulus relates to the agent's self-concept as well as social norms and values. By forming 
appraisals that take into consideration all the details that are important to the agent's well-being, 
47 
the agent is able to flexibly coordinate the remaining components of emotion so as to motivate 
adaptive responses to the stimulus in question
6
.  
It is important to note that Scherer concedes an episode that involves changes in only a 
majority of the components qualifies as an emotion, so long as the synchronization of these com-
ponents produces an adaptive response to a significant event (2010b, p. 49).  Thus, contrary to 
traditional accounts which hold emotional categories have necessary and sufficient conditions 
(Clore & Ortony, 1991), the component process model recognizes that not all the components 
need to be instantiated for an emotion to occur.  Although feelings are important on the compo-
nent process model account for monitoring the agent's internal state and their interaction with the 
environment, the agent can still have emotions without feelings, so long as she is able to coordi-
nate adaptive responses to stimuli appraised as relevant to her needs, goals, and values. As 
Scherer (2010b) asserts, the component process model of emotions provides a framework for 
which computational models of emotion can be constructed and conceptualized. By embodying 
computational models of emotion that accord with the component process model within a robot, 
emotions are no longer simply modeled, but instantiated through the robot's interaction with the 
physical environment.   
 
5.2 Kismet and Leonardo Have Emotions 
Kismet demonstrates its capacity for appraisal through its ability to assign valuations of 
arousal, valence, and stance to low-level percepts it forms through observing salient stimuli, in 
addition to determining whether the stimuli are undesired/desired/threatening.  Like humans, the 
robot compares its appraisal of the environment to its internal state (active drives, emotions) in 
                                                 
6
 Scherer is clear that most of coordination of the components of emotion occurs unconsciously on different pro-
cessing levels that work in parallel (2010b, p. 47).  
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order to determine how to coordinate future action, expressions, and overall emotional state.  It is 
important to note these appraisals pertain only to toys and human faces, as those are the only ob-
jects Kismet can classify. In Kismet's world, these are only types of objects that matter, and eve-
rything else is undesired or threatening.  Kismet was modeled after prelinguistic infants (0-13 
months; Shaffer, et al., 2002), which are not expected to have classification schemes for objects 
beyond animate and inanimate at this young of an age (Kuhlmeier, Bloom, & Wynn, 2004), so 
Kismet's limited categorization is fitting.  As Kismet's appraisals of the environment directly in-
fluence the actions and expressions the robot executes, Kismet satisfies requirements for the first 
component of emotion.  
Although Kismet lacks many of the neurophysiological systems that undergo change in 
humans (i.e. a biological brain, circulatory and endocrine systems), in addition to lacking limbs 
and appendages for manipulating the environment (the robot is only an anthropomorphic head!), 
the robot may still be said to adapt its face and neck configuration after an appraisal has been 
formed.  As noted earlier, as the robot's appraisal of the stimulus' arousal increases, Kismet's ears 
move upwards, while its mouth and eyes widen. Likewise, as arousal declines, Kismet's ears sink 
down, its mouth closes and its eyes shut. This is to say the appraisals Kismet forms have direct 
influence over the operation of motors in its ears, eyes, mouth and neck.  Furthermore, these ad-
aptations in body configuration characterize the fulfillment of action tendencies. The process by 
which a particular action is selected to be carried out is best illustrated by an example: If 
Kismet's social drive is active and there are people present in the room, Kismet's attention will be 
biased towards observing their faces, and the robot will ignore stimuli perceived as toys.  Al-
ready Kismet's distinguishing between people and toys motivates the robot's attention, which in-
volves manipulating the motors controlling its eyes. An individual that is appraised as desirable 
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(positive valence, approach stance) will further the action tendency to engage that person, while 
an individual who is too loud and/or approaches Kismet too rapidly will be appraised as intense, 
and will encourage avoidance tendencies.  Kismet's demonstrates its ability to form action 
tendencies in the sense that the robots appraisals of the environment are weighed in conjunction 
with its active drives and emotive state to determine the action that is carried out. (p. 291). For 
example, if the individual receives high valence and stance (approach) ratings, Kismet will then 
assess their proximity, which determines whether the robot calls out to the person or engages in 
vocal play with them. Thus, through forming appraisals of salient stimuli, Kismet is able to de-
liberate among action tendencies to execute the behavior most congruent with achieving its cur-
rent goal. What is more, Kismet is able to interact socially with humans through its facial and 
vocal expressions such that the robot's intentionality is clear to its interactants.  By displaying 
sorrow when a desired toy is taken away or by turning away from a rapidly approaching stimu-
lus, Kismet encourages its interactants to modify their actions in order to maintain the robot's 
state of well-being. Thus, Kismet can be said to instantiate emotions through forming appraisals 
of salient stimuli, undergoing bodily changes, producing expressions and carrying out action 
tendencies to facilitate the completion of its own goals.  
As Leonardo bears a similar affective-cognitive architecture to Kismet, the robot is able 
to perform the same functions as its predecessor, but to an even fuller extent. First, Leonardo has 
a body with moving arms and hands with which it can manipulate the environment. This means 
the robot is able to formulate a far wider range of action tendencies based off its appraisals of 
itself and other objects in the world. Second, Leonardo is able to appraise whether a stimulus is 
novel or has been encountered before, in order to determine whether any appraisals have been 
made of the stimulus in the past that could be referenced (Breazeal & Gray, 2009). Third and 
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most importantly, Leonardo is able to able to maintain ongoing beliefs about another's emotional 
state by imitating another's expressions so as to invoke an analogous emotional state within it-
self.  This additional capacity allows Leonardo to have an understanding of its interactants be-
havior, which has been shown to promote task learning in the robot (Breazeal, Buchsbaum, & 
Gray, 2004; Thomaz, Berlin, & Breazeal, 2005). On the component process model account, Leo-
nardo satisfies the first three appraisal objectives outlined by Scherer (2010b) as the robot (1) 
assesses the relevance of stimuli, (2) determines how they might affect the robot's 'well-being' 
and long-term goals, and (3) evaluates how best to cope with these stimuli as a result. As Leo-
nardo is able to use its multi-level appraisals to coordinate the components of its emotional sys-
tem in order to deal with stimuli within a dynamic environment, the robot qualifies as emotional, 
according to the component process model.  
In sum, there are already clear indications of emotions present in some robots, such as 
Kismet and Leonardo, and the possibility for expanding these capacities in the design of future 
artificial agents.  These robots are able to use emotions to select behaviors autonomously and 
communicate with humans to coordinate the achievement of their goals. What is more, Leonardo 
can utilize the embodiment of its own affective system to simulate the emotional state of others, 
such that the robot has an empathic understanding of its interactant.  With empathy comes a 
more accurate consideration of how others deliberate among actions, which means empathic ro-
bots may coordinate their own behaviors more successfully with humans in order to facilitate 
cooperation between parties.  
These robots are however emotionally limited in the sense that they were modeled after 
human prelinguistic infants and thus lack the functionality emotions provide to human adults.  
Kismet categorizes objects as only human faces or toys, and thus lacks awareness of other object 
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categories that might be relevant to the robots' flexible and adaptive behavior in its environment, 
such as young humans, old humans, other robots, animals, vehicles, etc.  Of course, the sorts of 
objects that are salient to a given robot should be contingent on the purpose the robot was meant 
to serve. An emergency response robot, for instance, should have the ability to distinguish be-
tween an injured and a non-injured person; the extent of the injury appraised should determine 
the state of urgency the robot bears. In addition, Kismet and Leonardo are able to evaluate pros-
ody of speech directed at them (e.g. whether it is approving, prohibitive, etc.), but do not under-
stand the semantic content of what is being said.  With the ability to extract emotion-laden lan-
guage from speech, future robots would be able to fully participate in human conversation. This 
is a vital ability for most robots in the service industry, such as server robots or personal assistant 
robots, whose occupation requires following explicit verbal directions. Future robots with these 
improvements to their capacity for appraisal will be able to more fully participate within the hu-
man social realm.  
Arbib (2005) is astute to note that the difference in ecological niche between humans and 
robots means that their emotions are not likely to be equivalent. So much of human emotion ul-
timately results from the satisfaction of or failure to satisfy our inherent drive for reproduction, 
like all other biological life.  While there is little reason to think a drive for reproduction could 
not be reproduced within a robot constructed with an artificial reproductive system, creating such 
a reproductive system and drive seems pointless if robots can more efficiently be manufactured 
on a factory assembly line.  However, if the goal is to create a robot for the sake of better under-
standing human emotions, then it would be worthwhile to include these details within its design.   
Furthermore, considerations should be made for future robots' likeness to human bodies 
and faces if these robots are to be accepted as social partners. It is particularly important that 
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roboticists are mindful of the uncanny valley effect which states that as robots come to resemble 
humans more and more closely, human observers will treat these robots increasingly more posi-
tive and empathic until a certain resemblance is reached where human observers become strong-
ly repulsed by the robot. While it is currently unclear why the uncanny valley effect occurs, a 
number of explanations have been proposed: due to an evolved mechanism for avoidance of ma-
tes with undesirable traits (Green, MacDorman, Ho, & Koch, 2008; Rhodes & Zebrowitz, 2002), 
because such entities remind humans of mortality (MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006), and because 
these provide conflicting perceptual cues as to the sorts of entities they are (Saygin, 2012)  As 
the robots continue to appear more like humans after passing through the uncanny valley howev-
er, human observers' response returns to being increasingly positive and empathic (Mori, 
1970/2012).  Despite having anthropomorphic facial features, Kismet and Leonardo avoid the 
uncanny valley effect by being easily distinguishable from humans; Kismet is distinguishable by 
lacking a body and having a face constructed from metal, and Leonardo by resembling a foreign 
creature. In contrast, many have considered the android constructed by Hiroshi Ishiguro to re-
semble himself, known as Geminoid, to fall within the uncanny valley, as the android nearly re-
sembles its creator, but is still recognizably different (Becker-Asano, Ogawa, Nishio, & Ishiguro, 
2010). Of course, an android that was physically indistinguishable from a human in appearance, 
movement and by touch would be positioned on the opposite side of the uncanny valley as Leo-
nardo and Kismet, and would achieve maximal empathic relations with humans, according to 
Mori. An android constructed with limbs that moved closely to the fashion of humans' would 
achieve further empathy from human interactants as it would be capable of common social and 
emotional gestures such as handshakes and hugging, which are essential to how humans develop 
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relationships with each other. By taking these considerations into account with future robots, we 
can ensure a fuller integration of robots into the social realm of humans.  
In conclusion, Kismet and Leonardo can be said to have emotions through their instantia-
tion of the majority of components that comprise emotions, despite lacking subjective feelings. 
However the emotional capacities of these robots parallel the capacities of human infants and 
thus, future efforts should be taken to scale their capacities up to the level of human adults.  As 
subjective feelings serve to monitor one's emotional state within humans, future experiments 
may look to uncover the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying feelings, though this is a 
more long-term goal for affective science.  As the fields of affective science and robotics pro-
gress, the recognition of some robots as emotional will continue to grow until the sophistication 
of their emotional capacities is beyond what can be ignored. 
5.3 Why Do Robots with Emotions Matter? 
Skeptics of robotic emotions might wonder whether the bar has been set too low for the 
phenomena that count as emotions. They might argue that robots having emotions as defined by 
the component process model (Scherer 2005, 2010) is trivial, as the definition of emotions pro-
vided the CPM does not match the lay conception of emotions; the lay conception of emotions 
requires that the agent experiences a feeling during an emotional episode, while the CPM does 
not.  The concern is that if feelings are not required for having emotions on the present account, 
yet feelings are central to how most people define emotions, that the present account has merely 
adapted an arbitrary definition of emotions.  
There is also a related concern regarding the importance of classifying these robots as 
having emotions. Even if Kismet, Leonardo, and other like robots have emotions on the present 
account, what is the theoretical advantage of categorizing them as emotional?  Categories allow 
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observers to make inferences about the entity in question, based on what categories it falls with-
in. For instance, classifying a whale as a mammal allows the observer to conclude that whales 
give birth to live young, are warm blooded, and the females have mammary glands, among other 
features. So what then can be inferred about these robots based on their having emotions?
7
  
When considering whether the present account provides an arbitrary definition of emo-
tions, it is important to note that this definition was derived from a shared theoretical understand-
ing of what emotions are. While there is no consensus among researchers as to what components 
of emotions are the most important for the occurrence of an emotional episode within humans, 
there is general agreement on what components are involved; these components are appraisals of 
events, neurophysiological responses, action tendencies, expressions, and feelings. However, de-
spite the insistence that feelings are necessary for having emotions on the lay account, there is 
disagreement among researchers as to whether this is actually the case. As was argued earlier, 
there are a number of researchers who hold that feelings are too poorly understood to be included 
within the broader definition of emotions at all (see Fellous & LeDoux, 2005), largely because 
there is no means for directly accessing an individual's phenomenology (LeDoux, 2002).  More 
important is the fact that these robots are able to continually perform what I argue is the central 
function of emotions: to attribute value to stimuli in the environment with respect to how those 
stimuli relate to the agent's goals/needs, in order to autonomously select an action or set of ac-
tions to satisfy those goals/needs. While other robots may be capable of fulfilling goals through 
non-emotional processes, Kismet and Leonardo utilize the coordination of the components of 
emotion in order to meet their goals through emotional processes.  Thus, these robots have emo-
                                                 
7
 I would like to extend a special thanks to Neil Van Leeuwen and Dan Weiskopf for bringing these concerns to my 
attention during the defense of this thesis.  
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tions in a non-arbitrary sense, even if the layperson may not recognize Kismet and Leonardo as 
having emotions.  
The theoretical advantage of classifying Kismet and Leonardo as emotional is that doing 
so allows researchers to treat these robots as a viable platform for studying how emotions occur 
in humans and in other biological life. While it is true that human emotions and the emotions of 
these robots are far from equivalent, it is important to remember that members of a category need 
not share every feature in common. For instance, platypuses lay eggs even though they are clas-
sified as mammals. If one were to make the prediction that platypuses give birth to live young 
based on their status as mammals, one would be incorrect. Nevertheless, platypuses' status as 
mammals allows one to correctly infer that they are warm-blooded, have fur, and breath through 
lungs. Therefore, a category can be useful, even if some of its members have exceptional features 
or lack certain features.  As the components of emotion are coordinated within these robots such 
that they are able to perform the central function of emotions, predictions may be made about 
how the absence or malfunction of one of these components will affect the agent's ability to per-
form this central function. The capacities of these robots also show that feelings are not neces-
sary for autonomous appraisal and action deliberation towards the fulfillment of goals/needs.  
Furthermore, the difference between human emotions and the emotions of these robots gives re-
searchers an indication of the sorts of mechanisms that must be added to the robots' architecture, 
such as pain receptors and a means for determining novel actions (i.e. actions that are not pre-
programmed), in order for the robots' emotions to more closely resemble humans.  Therefore, 
despite their dissimilarity to human emotions, there is sufficient similarity in the emotions of the-
se robots to use them as a means for studying human emotions. 
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6  CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have argued that it is possible for robots to have emotions, despite lacking 
subjective feelings.  I first demonstrated that while there is no consensus among contemporary 
theories of emotion on what emotions are, a number of components of emotion consistently ap-
pear within the literature: appraisals of events, physiological changes, action tendencies, expres-
sions and subjective feelings.  Second, I dissected the affective-cognitive architecture of MIT's  
Kismet and Leonardo, two robots explicitly designed to express emotions and to interact with 
humans, in order to explore whether they have emotions.  Before concluding on their emotional 
capacities, however, I first considered objections to the possibility of robots having emotions. 
The majority of these objections were based on the assertion that feelings are necessary for hav-
ing emotions, and that it is impossible/implausible for robots to ever have feelings due the differ-
ences in physiology between humans and robots.  I contended that while reproducing the exact 
details of human physiology that allow for subjective feelings is currently beyond our available 
modeling techniques, socially-competent robots can be constructed without having subjective 
experiences of emotion. More importantly, I argue in support of the component process model of 
emotion (Scherer, 2010), which asserts an agent may be said to have emotions if she can instan-
tiate at least a majority of the components of emotion.  As Kismet and Leonardo are able to in-
stantiate all of the components of emotion except for feelings, I hold that they qualify as emo-
tional agents, albeit with emotional capacities that are not equivalent to human emotions. Since 
these robots demonstrate emotional capacities analogous to human infants, I suggested ways in 
which future robots may be extended and scaled up in order to have more prosperous interactions 
with human adults.  
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It is crucial to make clear the distinction between robots that have human emotions and 
robots having emotions at all. In the former sense, it is trivially true that robots cannot have emo-
tions, as robots are not humans. To have human emotions, a robot would have to have an equiva-
lent physiology, control structure, ecological niche, influence from human social norms, etc.  In 
essence, to have identical emotions to humans, a robot would have to be human.  While humans 
serve as the central inspiration for emotional robots and virtual agents, it would be impossible to 
construct a robot identical to humans in every way, and it would make little sense to do so. A 
robot could be constructed with emotional capacities that allowed it to socialize with humans in a 
socially-appropriate way, despite differences in its physiology and control structure.  Kismet and 
Leonardo have emotions in this sense: they are able to recognize emotion expressed through fa-
cial displays and vocal intonations such that the robots coordinate their subsequent expressions 
to encourage further participation with human interactants.  What is more, Leonardo is able to 
gain an understanding of its interactants' emotional state by inducing an analogous state through 
reproducing the interactants' expressions and inputting the feedback into its own emotional sys-
tem.  These robots' emotional capacities make them less frustrating to deal with, which is a cen-
tral concern of Picard's (2003); in fact, interactants have reported enjoying their play with the 
robots and a desire to continue a pleasant interaction (Breazeal & Scassellati, 2000; Breazeal, 
2002a, 2003a). As robots become more mainstream, it will be an undeniable advantage if hu-
mans enjoy their experiences with robots, especially in industries where humans and robots have 
frequent, intimate interactions, such as in health care and education.  
In sum, robots with emotions already exist. Despite having emotional capacities analo-
gous to human infants, these robots are able to attribute value to objects and events in the envi-
ronment, in order to coordinate the preparation of their bodies for actions that will modify their 
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relationship to a constantly changing environment so as to further the pursuit of their goals.  As 
Scherer (2010) contends, this capacity to adapt to environmental contingencies for goal-pursuit is 
widely held within the emotion literature to be central to classifying what emotions are.  Thus, if 
we are interested in constructing robots that are able to autonomously complete tasks in dynamic, 
dangerous environments (e.g. deep ocean or planetary surface exploration, search-and-rescue; 
Breazeal, 2005), emotional capacities are of utmost importance. As the fields of robotics, artifi-
cial intelligence and emotion theory continue to develop, the possibility of emotional robots will 
become a greater reality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
REFERENCES 
Adolphs, R. (2005). Could a robot have emotions? Theoretical perspectives from social cognitive 
neuroscience In Fellous J.M. (Ed.) & Arbib, M. A. (Ed.), Who needs emotions?: The 
brain meets the robot (pp. 9-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Arbib, M. A. (2005). Beware the passionate robot neuroscience In Fellous J.M. (Ed.) & Arbib, 
M. A. (Ed.), Who needs emotions?: The brain meets the robot (pp. 333-384). Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Becker-Asano, C., Ogawa, K., Nishio, S., & Ishiguro, H. (2010). Exploring the uncanny valley 
with Geminoid HI-1 in a real-world application. In Proceedings of IADIS International 
Conference Interfaces and Human Computer Interaction (pp. 121-128). 
Ben-Ze’ev, A. (2000). The subtlety of emotion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Berlin, M., Gray, J., Thomaz, A. L., & Breazeal, C. (2006). Perspective taking: An organizing 
principle for learning in human-robot interaction. In Proceedings of the National Confer-
ence on Artificial Intelligence (Vol. 21, No. 2, p. 1444). Menlo Park, CA; Cambridge, 
MA; London; AAAI Press; MIT Press.  
Brady, M. S. (2009). The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. Philosophical studies, 145(3), 
413-430. 
Breazeal, C. (2002). Regulation and entrainment in human-robot interaction.The International 
Journal of Robotics Research, 21(10-11), 883-902. 
Breazeal, C. (2003). Emotion and sociable humanoid robots. International Journal of Human-
Computer Studies, 59(1), 119-155. 
Breazeal, C., & Scassellati, B. (2000). Infant-like social interactions between a robot and a hu-
man caretaker. Adaptive Behavior, 8, 47–72. 
60 
Breazeal, C., & Brooks, R. (2005). Robot emotion: A functional perspective In Fellous J.M. 
(Ed.) & Arbib, M. A. (Ed.), Who needs emotions?: The brain meets the robot (pp. 271-
310). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Breazeal, C., Gray, J., & Berlin, M. (2009). An embodied cognition approach to mindreading 
skills for socially intelligent robots. The International Journal of Robotics Re-
search, 28(5), 656-680. 
Buss, K. A., Schumacher, J. R. M., Dolski, I., Kalin, N. H., Goldsmith, H. H., & Davidson, R. J. 
(2003). Right frontal brain activity, cortisol, and withdrawal behavior in 6-month-old in-
fants. Behavioral neuroscience, 117(1), 11. 
Cao, B., Huang Y., Lu J., Xu F., Qiu Y., & Peng Y.  (2012). Cerebellar fastigal nuclear 
GABAergic projections to hypothalamus modulate immune function. Brain Behavior and 
Immunity, 27. 
Clore, G. L., & Ortony, A. (1991). What more is there to emotion concepts than prototypes?. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(1), 48-50. 
Clore, G. L., & Ortony, A. (2000). Cognition in emotion: Always, sometimes, or nev-
er. Cognitive neuroscience of emotion, 24-61. 
Coulson, M. (2004). Attributing emotion to static body postures: Recognition accuracy, confu-
sions, and viewpoint dependence. Journal of nonverbal behavior, 28(2), 117-139. 
Menzel, P., & D'Aluisio, F. (2001). Robo sapiens: Evolution of a new species. MIT Press. 
D'Arms, J., & Jacobson, D. (2003). VIII. The significance of recalcitrant emotion (or, anti-
quasijudgmentalism). Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 52, 127-145. 
Damiano, L., Dumouchel, P., & Lehmann, H. (2012). Should empathic social robots have  
interiority?. Social Robotics 268-277.  
61 
DeLancey, C. (2002). Passionate engines. What emotions reveal about mind and artificial intel-
ligence. New York. 
de Sousa, R. (2013) "Emotion", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved November 20 2013 from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/emotion/. 
Duchenne, G. B. (1990). The mechanism of human facial expression. Cambridge university 
press. 
Dumouchel, P. (2008). Social Emotions In Canamero L., Aylett R. (eds.), Animating Expressive 
Characters for Social Interaction (pp. 1-20). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Ekman, P. (1992). Facial Expression of Emotion: New Findings, New Questions. Psychological 
Science, 3, 34-38. 
Ekman, P. (1993). Facial expression and emotion. American Psychologist,48(4), 384. 
Ekman, P. (1997) Expression or Communication About Emotion. Uniting Psychology and Biol-
ogy: Integrative Perspectives on Human Development. 48, 384-392. 
Ekman, P. (2007). Emotions revealed: Recognizing faces and feelings to improve communication 
and emotional life. Macmillan. 
Ekman, P. E., & Davidson, R. J. (1994). The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions. Oxford 
University Press. 
Ekman, P. & Friesen, W.V. (1971) Constants across cultures in the face and emotion. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 17, 124–129. 
Ekman, P., Rolls, E. T., Perrett, D. I., & Ellis, H. D. (1992). Facial expressions of emotion: An 
old controversy and new findings [and discussion]. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences,335(1273), 63-69. 
62 
Ekman, P., & Cordaro, D. (2011). What is meant by calling emotions basic.Emotion Re-
view, 3(4), 364-370. 
Ellsworth, P.C., & Scherer, K.R. (2003). Appraisal processes in emotion. In R.J. Davidson, K.R. 
Scherer, & H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective sciences (pp. 572—595). New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Elster, J. (2004). Emotion and action. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Con-
temporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press. 19-36. 
Farthing, G. W. (1992). The psychology of consciousness. Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Feil-seifer, D., & Matarić, M. J. (2011). Ethical principles for socially assistive robotics. IEEE 
Robotics & Automation Magazine, Special issue on Roboethics, 18(1), 24-31 
Fellous, J. M. (2004). From human emotions to robot emotions. Architectures for Modeling 
Emotion: Cross-Disciplinary Foundations, American Association for Artificial Intelli-
gence, 39-46. 
Fellous, J. M., & Ledoux, J. E. (2005). Toward basic principles for emotional processing: What 
the fearful brain tells the robot. Who needs emotions, 79-115. 
Fischer, H., Wright C., Whalen P., Mcinerney S., Shin L., & Rauch S.   (2002). "Brain habitua-
tion during repeated exposure o fearful and neutral faces: a functional MRI study". Brain 
Research Bulletin 59. 
Fontaine, J. R., Scherer, K. R., Roesch, E. B., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2007). The world of emotions 
is not two-dimensional. Psychological science, 18(12), 1050-1057. 
Freitas-Magalhães, A. (2012). Facial expression of emotion. In V. S. Ramachandran (Ed.), Ency-
clopedia of Human Behavior (Vol. 2, pp.173-183). Oxford: Elsevier/Academic Press. 
63 
Fridlund, A. J.  Human facial expression: An evolutionary view. 1994. San Diego, CA: Academ-
ic. 
Fridlund, A. J. (1997). The new ethology of human facial expressions. The psychology of facial 
expression, 103. 
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Frijda, N. H. (2007). The laws of emotion. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & Ter Schure, E. (1989). Relations among emotion, appraisal, and 
emotional action readiness. Journal of personality and social psychology, 57(2), 212. 
Gardner, S. (1993). Irrationality and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Goldie, P. (2000). The emotions. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Green, R. D., MacDorman, K. F., Ho, C.-C., & Vasudevan, S. K. (2008). Sensitivity to the pro-
portions of faces that vary in human likeness. Computers in Human Behavior, 24(5), 
2456–2474. 
Graham, G. (2010) Behaviorism In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/behaviorism/>. 
Hall, L., Johansson, P., Tärning, B., Sikström, S., & Deutgen, T. (2010). Magic at the Market-
place: Choice blindness for the taste of jam and the smell of tea. Cognition, 17,54-61. 
Hall, L., Johansson, P., & Strandberg, T. (2012). Lifting the veil of morality: Choice blindness 
and attitude reversals on a self-transforming survey. PloS one,7(9), e45457. 
Izard, C. E. (1992). Basic emotions, relations among emotions, and emotion-cognition relations. 
Psychological Review, 99(3), 561-565.  
64 
Izard, C. E. (2007). Basic emotions, natural kinds, emotion schemas, and a new paradigm. Per-
spectives on psychological science, 2(3), 260-280. 
Jeannerod, M. (2005). How do we decipher others’ minds In Fellous J.M. (Ed.) & Arbib, M. A. 
(Ed.), Who needs emotions?: The brain meets the robot (147-169). Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.  
Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. (2005). Failure to detect mismatches between 
intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science, 310, 116-119. 
Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., Tärning, B., & Lind, A. (2006). How something can be said 
about telling more than we can know: On choice blindness and introspection. Conscious-
ness and Cognition: An International Journal, 15(4), 673-692. 
Keltner, D., Ekman, P., Gonzaga, G. C., & Beer, J. (2003). Facial expression of emotion In 
 Richard J. (Ed), Scherer, Klaus R. (Ed), Goldsmith, H. Hill (Ed),   Handbook of affective 
sciences. Series in affective science (pp. 415-432). New York, NY, US: Oxford Universi-
ty Press. 
Kuhlmeier, V. A., Bloom, P., & Wynn, K. (2004). Do 5-month-old infants see humans as mate-
rial objects?. Cognition, 94(1), 95-103. 
Lacewing, M. (2007). Do unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings?. Philosophical 
Psychology, 20(1), 81-104. 
Lambie, J. A., & Marcel, A. J. (2002). Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: a 
theoretical framework. Psychological review, 109(2), 219. 
Lange, C. G. (1885). The mechanism of the emotions. The Classical Psychologists. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1912. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1991) Emotion and Adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
65 
LeDoux, J. (2002). Synaptic Self: How brains become who we are. Viking Penguin, New York. 
Lövheim, H. (2012). A new three-dimensional model for emotions and monoamine neurotrans-
mitters. Medical Hypotheses, 78(2), 341-348. 
Öhman, A., Flykt, A., & Lundqvist, D. (2000). Unconscious emotion: Evolutionary perspectives, 
psychophysiological data and neuropsychological mechanisms. Cognitive neuroscience 
of emotion, 296. 
MacDorman, K. F.& Ishiguro, H. (2006). The uncanny advantage of using androids in cognitive 
science research. Interaction Studies, 7(3), 297-337. 
Meltzoff, A., & Moore, M. K. (1997). Explaining facial imitation: A theoretical model. Early 
Development and Parenting, 6, 179–192. 
Messinger, D. S., Fogel, A., & Dickson, K. L. (2001). All smiles are positive, but some smiles 
are more positive than others. Developmental Psychology,37(5), 642. 
Mori, M. (1970/2012). The uncanny valley (K. F. MacDorman & N. Kageki, Trans.). IEEE Ro-
botics & Automation Magazine, 19(2), 98–100. 
Murphy, S. T., & Zajonc, R. B. (1993). Affect, cognition, and awareness: affective priming with 
optimal and suboptimal stimulus exposures. Journal of personality and social psycholo-
gy, 64(5), 723. 
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on men-
tal processes. Psychological review, 84(3), 231. 
Novaco, R. W. (1986). Anger as a clinical and social problem. Advances in the study of aggres-
sion, 2, 1-67.  
Novaco, R. W., & Taylor, J. L. (2000). Anger. Encyclopedia of psychology, 1, 170-174. 
Nussbaum, M. (2001). Upheavals of thought. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
66 
Miyake, K., & Yamazaki, K. (1995). Self-conscious emotions, child rearing, and child psycho-
pathology in Japanese culture. Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, 
embarrassment, and pride, 488-504. 
Moors, A., Ellsworth, P. C., Scherer, K. R., & Frijda, N. H. (2013). Appraisal theories of emo-
tion: State of the art and future development. Emotion Review,5(2), 119-124. 
Novaco, R. W. (2000). Anger. Encyclopedia of Psychology, Oxford University Press. 
Olsson, A., & Phelps, E. A. (2007). Social learning of fear. Nature neuroscience, 10(9), 1095-
1102. 
Panksepp, J. (1993). Neurochemical control of moods and emotions: Amino acids to neuropep-
tides In Lewis, Michael (Ed); Haviland, Jeannette M. (Ed), Handbook of emotions (pp. 
87-107). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press. 
Panksepp, J. (2007). Neurologizing the Psychology of Affects. Perspectives on Psychoogical 
Science, 2: 281–296. 
Parkinson, B. (2013). Contextualizing Facial Activity. Emotion Review, 5(1), 97-103. 
Picard, R. W. (2003). What does it mean for a computer to “have” emotions. Emotions in hu-
mans and artifacts, 87-102. 
Pronin, E. (2009). The introspection illusion. Advances in experimental social psychology, 41, 1-
67. 
Potegal, M., & Stemmler, G. (2010). Constructing a neurology of anger. In International Hand-
book of Anger (pp. 39-59). New York: Springer. 
Pribram, K. H. (1960). A review of theory in physiological psychology. Annual Review of Psy-
chology, 11, 1–40. 
67 
Purves, D., Augustine, G. J., Fitzpatrick, D., Katz, L. C., LaMantia, A. S., McNamara, J. O., & 
Williams, S. M. (2001). Emotions: Physiological Changes Associated with Emotion. 
Neuroscience, 2nd Edition. Sinauer Associates Inc.  
Reisenzein, R. (1994). Pleasure-arousal theory and the intensity of emotions. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 67(3), 525. 
Rhodes, G., & Zebrowitz, L. A. (2002). Facial attractiveness: Evolutionary, cognitive, and so-
cial perspectives (Vol. 1). Ablex Publishing Corporation. 
Roberts, R. (2003). Emotions: An essay in moral psychology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rolls, E. T. (1999). The brain and emotion (Vol. 4, p. 1619). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rolls, E. T. (2005). Emotion explained. Oxford University Press. 
Roseman, I. J., & Smith, C. A. (2001). Appraisal theory: Overview, assumptions, varieties, con-
troversies. 
Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. Psychological 
review, 110(1), 145. 
Russell, J. A. (2009). Emotion, core affect, and psychological construction. Cognition and Emo-
tion, 23(7), 1259-1283. 
Russell, J. A., Bachorowski, J. A., & Fernández-Dols, J. M. (2003). Facial and vocal expressions 
of emotion. Annual review of psychology, 54(1), 329-349. 
Saygin, A.P. (2012). The Thing That Should Not Be: Predictive Coding and the Uncanny Valley 
in Perceiving Human and Humanoid Robot Actions. Social Cognitive Affective Neurosci-
ence 7: 413–22. 
68 
Scherer, K.R. (1987). Toward a Dynamic Theory of Emotion: The Component Process Model of 
Affective States In Geneva Studies in Emotion and Communication (pp. 1–98); available 
at: http://www.unige.ch/fapse/emotion/genstudies/genstudies.html 
Scherer, K. R. (2000). Psychological models of emotion. The neuropsychology of emotion, 137, 
162. 
Scherer, K. R. (2001). Appraisal considered as a process of multilevel sequential check-
ing. Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, research, 92, 120. 
Scherer, K. R. (2003). Vocal communication of emotion: A review of research para-
digms. Speech communication, 40(1), 227-256. 
Scherer, K. R. (2004, April). Feelings integrate the central representation of appraisal-driven re-
sponse organization in emotion. In Feelings and emotions: The Amsterdam symposi-
um (pp. 136-157). Cambridge,, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Scherer, K.R. (2005). What are emotions? And how can they be measured? Social Science In-
formation 44, 693-727. 
Scherer, K.R. (2010a) Emotion and emotional competence: conceptual and theoretical issues for 
modelling agents. In Scherer, K. R., Bänziger, T., & Roesch, E. (Eds.), A Blueprint for 
Affective Computing: A sourcebook and manual. Oxford University Press. 
Scherer, K. R. (2010b). The component process model: Architecture for a comprehensive com-
putational model of emergent emotion. Blueprint for affective computing: A sourcebook, 
47-70. 
Schneider, F., Gur, R. C., Gur, R. E., & Muenz, L. R. (1994). Standardized mood induction with 
happy and sad facial expressions. Psychiatry research,51(1), 19-31. 
Searle, J. (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 417–457. 
69 
Searle, J. (1990). Is the Brain a Digital Computer? Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 64 (November): 21–37. 
Searle, J. (2002). Consciousness and Language. Cambridge University Press.  
Shaffer, D. D. R., & Kipp, K. (2007). Developmental psychology: Childhood and adolescence. 
Cengage Learning. Chicago  
Shannon, C. E. (1950). XXII. Programming a computer for playing chess. Philosophical maga-
zine, 41(314), 256-275. 
Sherman, S. M. (2006). Thalamus. Scholarpedia, 1(9), 1583. 
Siegler, R. (2006). How children develop: Exploring child develop student media tool kit & sci-
entific American reader to accompany how children develop. New York: Worth Publish-
ers. 
Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2009). Putting appraisal in context: Toward a relational model of 
appraisal and emotion. Cognition and Emotion, 23(7), 1352-1372. 
Smith, C., & Scott, H. (1997). A componential approach to the meaning of facial expressions. In 
J. Russell & J. Fernandez-Dols (Eds.), The psychology of facial expression (pp. 229–
254). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Calhoun, C. & Solomon, R. C. (eds.) (1984). What is an Emotion?: Classic Readings in Philo-
sophical Psychology. Oxford University Press. 
Solomon, R.C. (2004). Emotions, thoughts, and feelings: Emotions as engagements with the 
world.  Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 1-18. 
Stoljar, D. (2009).  Physicalism In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/physicalism/>. 
70 
Stueber, K. R. (2006). Rediscovering empathy: Agency, folk psychology, and the human scienc-
es. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Thomaz, A. L., Berlin, M., & Breazeal, C. (2005). An embodied computational model of social 
referencing. In Robot and Human Interactive Communication, 2005. ROMAN 2005. 
IEEE International Workshop on (pp. 591-598). IEEE. 
Tomkins, S. S. (1962). Affect, imagery, consciousness: Vol. I. The positive affects. 
Turkle, S. (2012). Alone together: Why we expect more from technology and less from each oth-
er. Basic Books. 
Van Gulick, R. (2011)., Consciousness In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 
from <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/consciousness/>. 
Velik, R. (2010). Why machines cannot feel. Minds and Machines, 20(1), 1-18. 
 
Videbeck, S. L. (2006). Psychiatric mental health nursing (3rd ed.). Lippincott Williams & Wil-
kins. 
Wallbott, H. G. (1998). Bodily expression of emotion. European journal of social psycholo-
gy, 28(6), 879-896. 
Warwick, K., Xydas, D., Nasuto, S. J., Becerra, V. M., Hammond, M. W., Downes, J., & 
Whalley, B. J. (2010). Controlling a mobile robot with a biological brain. Defence Sci-
ence Journal, 60(1), 5-14. 
Wild, B., Erb, M., & Bartels, M. (2001). Are emotions contagious? Evoked emotions while 
viewing emotionally expressive faces: quality, quantity, time course and gender differ-
ences. Psychiatry research, 102(2), 109-124. 
Wilson, T. D., & Dunn, E. W. (2004). Self-knowledge: Its limits, value, and potential for im-
provement. Psychology, 55. 
71 
Winkielman, P., & Zajonc & Norbert Schwarz, R. B. (1997). Subliminal affective priming resists 
attributional interventions. Cognition & Emotion, 11(4), 433-465. 
Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., Reber, R., & Fazendeiro, T. A. (2000). Affective and Cognitive 
Consequences of Visual Fluency: When Seeing is Easy on the Mind. Visual Persuasion. 
Wollheim, R. (1984). The thread of life. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American psycholo-
gist, 35(2), 151. 
Zajonc, R. B. (1984). On the primacy of affect. American Psychologist,  39(2), 117-123. 
Zajonc, R. B. (1998). Emotions In Gilbert, Daniel T. (Ed); Fiske, Susan T. (Ed); Lindzey, Gard-
ner (Ed), The handbook of social psychology, Vols. 1 and 2 (4th ed.), (pp. 591-632). New 
York, NY, US: McGraw-Hill. 
Zajonc, R. B. (2000). Feeling and thinking: Closing the debate over the independence of affect In 
Forgas, Joseph P. (Ed), (2000). Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social cogni-
tion. Studies in emotion and social interaction, second series., (pp. 31-58). New York, 
NY, US: Cambridge University Press 
 
 
